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Abstract
Hilbert and Bernays avoided overspecification of Hilbert’s ε-operator. They axiomatized only what was relevant for their proof-
theoretic investigations. Semantically, this left the ε-operator underspecified. After briefly reviewing the literature on semantics
of Hilbert’s epsilon operator, we propose a new semantics with the following features: We avoid overspecification (such as right-
uniqueness), but admit indefinite choice, committed choice, and classical logics. Moreover, our semantics for the ε simplifies proof
search and is natural in the sense that it mirrors some cases of referential interpretation of indefinite articles in natural language.
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1. Motivation, requirements specification, and overview
Hilbert’s ε-symbol is a binder that forms terms; just like Peano’s ι-symbol, which is sometimes attributed to
Russell and written as ι¯ or as an inverted ι. Roughly speaking, the term εx.A, formed from a variable x and a
formula A, denotes just some object that is chosen such that —if possible— A (seen as a predicate on x) holds for it.
For Ackermann, Bernays, and Hilbert, the ε was an intermediate tool in proof theory, to be eliminated in the end.
Instead of giving a model-theoretic semantics for the ε, they just specified those axioms which were essential in their
proof transformations. These axioms did not provide a complete definition, but left the ε underspecified.
After reviewing the literature on extended semantics given to Hilbert’s ε-operator in the 2nd half of the 20th century,
we will propose a novel semantics for it.
Descriptive terms such as εx.A and ιx.A are of universal interest and applicability. We suppose that our novel
treatment will turn out to be useful in many areas where logic is designed or applied as a tool for description and
reasoning.
For the usefulness of such descriptive terms we consider the requirements listed below to be the most impor-
tant ones. Our new indefinite ε-operator satisfies these requirements and—as it is defined by novel semantical
techniques—may serve as the paradigm for the design of similar operators satisfying these requirements.
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is required, and where—to the contrary—different objects corresponding with the description may be chosen
for different occurrences of the same descriptive term.
Requirement II (Reasoning): In a reductive proof step, it must be possible to replace a descriptive term with a term
that corresponds with its description. The soundness of such a replacement must be expressible and should
be verifiable in the original calculus.
Requirement III (Semantics): The semantics should be simple, straightforward, natural, formal, and model-based.
Overspecification should be avoided carefully. Furthermore, the semantics should be modular and abstract in
the sense that it adds the operator to a variety of logics, independently of the details of a concrete logic.
This paper is organized as follows: After a general introduction to the ε in § 2 and a review of the literature on the ε’s
semantics w.r.t. adequacy and Hilbert’s intentions in § 3, we explain and formalize our novel approach to the ε’s
semantics: informally in § 4, more formally in § 5, summarized in § 6. We provide examples of possible application
in the area of semantics of natural language in § 7, discuss some conceivable objections and variations in § 8, and
conclude in § 9.
2. General introduction to Hilbert’s ε
We introduce to the ι- and ε-operators (§ 2.1), to the ε’s proof-theoretic origin (§ 2.2), and to our contrasting
semantical objective (§ 2.3) with its emphasis on indefinite and committed choice (§ 2.4).
2.1. From the ι to the ε
The first occurrence of a descriptive ι-operator seems to be in Frege (1893/1903), Vol. I, where a boldface backslash
is written instead of the ι. In Peano (1896f.), ‘ ι¯ ’ is written instead of ‘ ι ’. In Peano (1899a), we find an alternative
notation besides ‘ ι¯ ’, namely a ι-symbol upside-down. Both notations were to denote the inverse of Peano’s ι-function,
which constructs the singleton set of its argument. Today, we write ‘{y}’ for Peano’s ‘ιy ’, the upside-down ι is not
easily available in typesetting, and we write a simple non-inverted ι for the descriptive ι-operator.
All the slightly differing definitions of semantics for the ι-operator agree on the following: If there is a unique x
such that the formula A holds (seen as a predicate on x), then the ι-term ιx.A denotes this unique object.
Example 1 (ι-binder). For an informal introduction to the ι-binder, consider Father to be a predicate for which
Father(Heinrich III,Heinrich IV) holds, i.e. “Heinrich III is father of Heinrich IV”. Now, “the father of Heinrich IV”
can be denoted by
ιx.Father(x,Heinrich IV),
and because this is nobody but Heinrich III, i.e.





and thus ∃y.Father(y,Adam), but, oops! Adam and Eve do not have any fathers. If you do not agree, you would
probably appreciate the following problem that occurs when somebody has God as an additional father.
Father(Holy Ghost, Jesus) ∧ Father(Joseph, Jesus). (1.2)
Then the Holy Ghost is the father of Jesus and Joseph is the father of Jesus:
Holy Ghost = ιx.Father(x, Jesus) ∧ Joseph = ιx.Father(x, Jesus) (1.3)
This implies something the Pope may not accept, namely Holy Ghost = Joseph, and he anathematized Heinrich IV
in the year 1076:
Anathematized(ιx.Pope(x),Heinrich IV,1076). (1.4)
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sake of completeness and syntactic eliminability. There are basically three ways of giving a semantics to the ι-terms
without overspecification:
Russell’s ι-operator: In Whitehead & Russell (1925ff.), the ι-terms do not refer to an object but make sense only in
the context of a sentence. This was nicely described already in Russell (1905), without using any symbol for
the ι, however.
Hilbert’s ι-operator: To overcome the complex difficulties of that non-referential definition, in Hilbert & Bernays
(1968/70), Vol. I, p. 392ff., a completed proof of ∃!x.A was required to preceed each formation of the
term ιx.A, which otherwise could not be considered a well-formed term at all.
Peano’s ι-operator: Since the inflexible treatment of Hilbert’s ι-operator makes the ι quite impractical and the formal
syntax of logic undecidable in general, in Vol. II of the same book, the ε, however, is already given a more
flexible treatment. There, the simple idea is to leave the ε-terms uninterpreted, as will be described below.
In this paper, we present this more flexible view also for the ι. Moreover, this view is already Peano’s
original one, cf. Peano (1896f.).
At least in non-modal classical logics, it is a well justified standard that each term denotes. More precisely—in each
model or structure S under consideration—each occurrence of a proper term must denote an object in the universe
of S . Following that standard, to be able to write down ιx.A without further consideration, we have to treat ιx.A
as an uninterpreted term about which we only know
∃!x.A ⇒ A{x → ιx.A} (ι0)
or in different notation
(∃!x. (A(x))) ⇒ A(ιx. (A(x))),
where, for some new y, we can define ∃!x.A := ∃y.∀x. (x=y ⇔ A).
With (ι0) as the only axiom for the ι, the term ιx.A has to satisfy A (seen as a predicate on x) only if there exists
a unique object such that A holds for it. Moreover, the problems presented in Example 1 do not appear because (1.1)
and (1.3) are not valid. Indeed, the description of (1.1) lacks existence and the descriptions of (1.3) and (1.4) lack
uniqueness. The price we have to pay here is that—roughly speaking—the term ιx.A is of no use unless the unique
existence ∃!x.A can be derived.
2.2. On the ε’s proof-theoretic origin
Compared to ι, the ε is more useful because—instead of (ι0)—it comes with the stronger axiom
∃x.A ⇒ A{x → εx.A} (ε0)
More precisely, as the formula ∃x.A (which has to be true to guarantee a meaningful interpretation of the
ε-term εx.A ) is weaker than the corresponding formula ∃!x.A (for the resp. ι-term), the area of useful appli-
cation is wider for the ε- than for the ι-operator. Moreover, in case of ∃!x.A, the ε-operator picks the same element
as the ι-operator, i.e. ∃!x.A ⇒ ( εx.A = ιx.A ).
As the basic methodology of David Hilbert’s Programme is to treat all symbols as meaningless, he does not give
us any semantics but only the axiom (ε0). Although no meaning is required, it furthers the understanding. And
therefore, in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), the fundamental work which summarizes the foundational contributions of
David Hilbert and his group, Paul Bernays writes:
εx.A . . . \iĆ ein Ding deŊ IndividuŚnbereiĚŊ, und zwar iĆ dieseŊ Ding gemĽj der inhaltliĚen UeberseŃung der Formel (ε0) ei n
s o l Ě e Ŋ, au f d a Ŋ j e n e Ŋ P r Ľ d i k a t A z u t r i Ď t, v o r au Ŋ g e s e Ń t, d a sŊ e Ŋ
đ b e r h au p t au f ei n D i n g d e Ŋ I n d i v i d u Ś n b e r ei Ě Ŋ z u t r i Ď t."
[Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), Vol. II, p.12, modernized orthography]
εx.A . . . “is an object of the universe for which—according to the semantical translation of the formula (ε0) —the
predicate A holds, provided that A holds for any object of the universe at all.”
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Just as for the ι, for the ε we have Heinrich III = εx.Father(x,Heinrich IV) and
Father(εx.Father(x,Heinrich IV),Heinrich IV).
But, from the contrapositive of (ε0) and ¬Father(εx.Father(x,Adam),Adam), we now conclude that
¬∃y.Father(y,Adam). 
David Hilbert did not need any semantics or precise intention for the ε-symbol because it was introduced merely as
a formal syntactical device to facilitate proof-theoretic investigations, motivated by the possibility to get rid of the
existential and universal quantifiers via
∃x.A ⇔ A{x → εx.A} (ε1)
∀x.A ⇔ A{x → εx.¬A} (ε2)
When we remove all quantifiers in a derivation of the (Hilbert-style) predicate calculus of Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70)
along (ε1) and (ε2), the following transformations occur: Tautologies are turned into tautologies. The axioms
A{x →t} ⇒ ∃x.A and ∀x.A ⇒ A{x →t}
are turned into
A{x →t} ⇒ A{x → εx.A} (ε-formula)
and—roughly speaking w.r.t. two-valued logics—its contrapositive, respectively. The inference steps are turned into
inference steps: modus ponens into modus ponens; instantiation of free variables as well as quantifier introduction
into instantiation including ε-terms. Finally, the ε-formula is taken as a new axiom scheme instead of (ε0) because it
has the advantage of being free of quantifiers.
This argumentation is actually the start of the proof transformation which constructively proves the first of Bernays’
two theorems on ε-elimination in first-order logic, the so-called 1st ε-theorem. In its extended form, this theorem may
be stated as follows:
Theorem 3 (Extd. 1st ε-Theorem, Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), Vol. II, p.79f.).
From a derivation of ∃x1. . . .∃xr .A (containing no bound variables besides the ones bound by the prefix ∃x1. . . .∃xr .)
from the formulas P1, . . . ,Pk (containing no bound variables) in the predicate calculus (incl., as axiom schemes,
ε-formula and (to specify equality) reflexivity and substitutability), we can construct a (finite) disjunction of the
form ∨si=0 A{x1, . . . , xr → ti,1, . . . , ti,r} and a derivation of it, in which bound variables do not occur at all,
from P1, . . . ,Pk in the elementary calculus (i.e. tautologies plus modus ponens and instantiation of free variables). 
Note that r, s range over natural numbers including 0, and that A, ti,j , and Pi are ε-free because otherwise they would
have to include (additional) bound variables.
Moreover, the 2nd ε-Theorem in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), Vol. II, states that the ε (just as the ι, cf. Hilbert &
Bernays (1968/70), Vol. I) is a conservative extension of the predicate calculus in the sense that each formal proof
of an ε-free formula can be transformed into a formal proof that does not use the ε at all. Generally, however, it is
not a conservative extension when we add the ε either with (ε0), with (ε1), or with the ε-formula to other first-order
logics—may they be weaker such as intuitionistic logic, or stronger such as set theories with axiom schemes over
arbitrary terms including the ε, cf. § 3.1.3. Moreover, even in standard first-order logic there is no translation from
the formulas containing the ε to formulas not containing it.
2.3. Our objective
While the historiographical and technical research on the ε-theorems is still going on and the methods of
ε-elimination and ε-substitution did not die with Hilbert’s Programme, this is not our subject here. We are less
interested in Hilbert’s formal programme and the consistency of mathematics than in the powerful use of logic in
creative processes. And, instead of the tedious syntactical proof transformations, which easily lose their usefulness
and elegance within their technical complexity and which—more importantly—can only refer to an already existing
logic, we look for semantical means for finding new logics and new applications. And the question that still has to be
answered in this field is: What would be a proper semantics for Hilbert’s ε?
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Just as the ι-symbol is usually taken to be the referential interpretation of the definite articles in natural languages,
it is our opinion that the ε-symbol should be that of the indefinite determiners (articles and pronouns) such as “a(n)”
or “some”.
Example 4 (ε instead of ι, part II). (continuing Example 1)
It may well be the case that
Holy Ghost = εx.Father(x, Jesus) ∧ Joseph = εx.Father(x, Jesus)
i.e. that “The Holy Ghost is a father of Jesus and Joseph is a father of Jesus.” But this does not bring us into trouble
with the Pope because we do not know whether all fathers of Jesus are equal. This will become clearer when we
reconsider this in Example 13. 
Closely connected to indefinite choice (also called “indeterminism” or “don’t care nondeterminism”) is the notion of
committed choice. For example, when we have a new telephone, we typically don’t care which number we get, but
once a number has been chosen for our telephone, we will insist on a commitment to this choice, so that our phone
number is not changed between two incoming calls.
Example 5 (Committed choice).
Suppose we want to prove ∃x. (x 	= x)
According to (ε1) from § 2.2 this reduces to εx. (x 	=x) 	= εx. (x 	=x)
Since there is no solution to x 	=x we can replace
εx. (x 	=x) with anything. Thus, the above reduces to 0 	= εx. (x 	=x)
and then, by exactly the same argumentation, to 0 	= 1
which is valid. Thus, we have proved our original formula ∃x. (x 	= x), which, however, is invalid.
What went wrong? Of course, we have to commit to our choice for all occurrences of the ε-term introduced when
eliminating the existential quantifier: If we choose 0 on the left-hand side, we have to commit to the choice of 0 on
the right-hand side, too. 
3. Semantics for Hilbert’s ε in the literature
Let us briefly review the literature on the ε’s semantics with a an emphasis on practical adequacy and Hilbert’s
intentions. To the best of our knowledge, we only omit Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator, which will be discussed
in § 7.
3.1. Right-unique semantics
In contrast to the indefiniteness we suggested in § 2.4, in the literature nearly all semantics for Hilbert’s ε-operator
are functional, i.e. [right-] unique; cf. Leisenring (1969) and the references there.
3.1.1. Ackermann’s (II,4) = Bourbaki’s (S7) = Leisenring’s (E2)
In Ackermann (1938) under the label (II,4), in Bourbaki (1954) under the label (S7) (where a τ is written for
the ε, which must not be confused with Hilbert’s τ -operator, cf. Hilbert (1923)), and in Leisenring (1969) under the
label (E2), we find the following axiom scheme:
∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ εx.A0 = εx.A1 (E2)
Contrary to our version (E2′) in Lemma 31 of § 5.6, in the standard framework the axiom (E2) imposes a right-unique
behavior for the ε-operator, which is based on the extension of the predicate.
Axiom systems including (E2) are called extensional because—from a semantical point of view—the value
of εx.A in each semantical structure S is functionally dependent on the extension of the formula A, i.e. on
{ o | eval(S unionmulti {x →o})(A) = TRUE },
where ‘eval’ is the standard evaluation function that maps a structure (or algebra, interpretation) (including a valuation
of the free variables) to a function mapping terms and formulas to values.
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(1999) the value of εx.A may additionally depend on the syntax besides the semantics. It is then given as a function
depending on a semantical structure and on the syntactical details of the term εx.A. In Giese & Ahrendt (1999),
p.177, we read: “This definition contains no restriction whatsoever on the valuation of ε-terms.” This is, however,
not true because it imposes the restriction of a right-unique behavior, which denies the possibility of an indefinite
behavior, as we will see below.
Note that (E2) has a disastrous effect in intuitionistic logic. This is already the case for its proper consequence
∀x.A0 ∧ ∀x.A1 ⇒ εx.A0 = εx.A1, which—together with (ε0) and say “0 	=1”—turns each classical validity
into an intuitionistic one; cf. Bell (1993a), § 3. For the strong consequences of the ε-formula in intuitionistic logic
cf. Meyer-Viol (1995).
3.1.2. Roots of the right-uniqueness requirement
The omnipresence of the right-uniqueness requirement may have its historical justification in the fact that if we
expand the dots “. . . ” in the quotation preceding Example 2 in § 2.2, the full quotation reads:
\DaŊ ε-Symbol bildet somit eine Art der Verallgemeinerung deŊ μ-SymbolŊ fđr einen beliebigen IndividuŚnbereiĚ. Der Form naĚ
Ćellt eŊ eine Funktion eineŊ variablen PrĽdikateŊ dar, welĚeŊ aujer demjenigen Argument, auf welĚeŊ siĚ die zu dem ε-Symbol gehŹrige
gebundene Variable bezieht, noĚ freie Variable alŊ Argumente (\Parameter") enthalten kann. Der Wert dieser Funktion fđr ein beĆimmteŊ
PrĽdikat A (bei FeĆlegung der Parameter) iĆ ein Ding deŊ IndividuŚnbereiĚŊ, und zwar iĆ dieseŊ Ding gemĽj der inhaltliĚen UeberseŃung
der Formel (ε0) ei n s o l Ě e Ŋ, au f d a Ŋ j e n e Ŋ P r Ľ d i k a t A z u t r i Ď t, v o r au Ŋ g e s e Ń t,
d a sŊ e Ŋ đ b e r h au p t au f ei n D i n g d e Ŋ I n d i v i d u Ś n b e r ei Ě Ŋ z u t r i Ď t."
[Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), Vol. II, p.12, modernized orthography]
“Thus, the ε-symbol forms a kind of generalization of the μ-symbol for arbitrary universes. Syntactically, it pro-
vides a function of a variable predicate, which—besides the argument to which the variable bound by the ε-symbol
refers—may contain free variables as arguments (“parameters”). The value of this function for a given predicate A
(for fixed values of the parameters) is an object of the universe for which—according to the semantical trans-
lation of the formula (ε0) —the predicate A holds, provided that A holds for any object of the universe at all.”
(“Syntactically” may be replaced with “Structurally”)
Here the word “function” could be understood in its mathematical sense to denote a (right-) unique relation. And,
what kind of function could it be but a choice function, choosing an element from the set of objects that satisfy A ?
Accordingly, at a different place, we read:
\Darđber hinauŊ hat daŊ ε die Rolle der AuŊwahlfunktion, d. h. im Falle, wo Aa auf mehrere Dinge zutreĎen kann, iĆ εA
i r g e n d ei n e Ŋ von den Dingen a, auf welĚe Aa zutriĎt." [Hilbert (1928), p. 68]
“Beyond that, the ε has the rôle of the choice function, i.e. in the case where A(a) may hold for several objects,
εx. (A(x)) is an arbitrary one of the objects a for which A(a) holds.”
3.1.3. Universal and generalized choice functions
Since David Hilbert himself seems to have confused the consequences of the ε on the axiom of choice in the last
but one paragraph of Hilbert (1923), we point out: Although the ε supplies us with a syntactical means for expressing a
universal choice function, the axioms (E2), (ε0), (ε1), and (ε2) do not imply the axiom of choice in set theories, unless
the axiom schemes of replacement (collection) and comprehension (separation, subset) also range over expressions
containing the ε; cf. Leisenring (1969), § IV 4.4.
Moreover, to be precise, the notion of a “choice function” must be generalized here because we need a total
function on the power set of each (non-empty) universe. Thus, a value must be supplied even at the empty set: f is
defined to be a generalized choice function if f : dom(f ) →⋃ (dom(f )) and ∀x ∈dom(f ). (x =∅ ∨ f (x)∈x).
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In Hermes (1965), p.18, the ε suffers from some overspecification in addition to (E2):
εx. false = εx. true (ε5)
This sets the value of the generalized choice function f at the empty set to the value of f at the whole universe.




(∃y.A0{x →y} ⇒ A0)
⇔ (∃y.A1{x →y} ⇒ A1)
)
⇒ εx.A0 = εx.A1 (vext)
Indeed, (vext) implies (E2) and (ε5). The other direction, however, does not hold for intuitionistic logic, where,
roughly speaking, (vext) additionally implies that if the same elements make A0 and A1 as true as possible, then the
ε-operator picks the same element for A0 and A1, even if the suprema ∃y.A0{x →y} and ∃y.A1{x →y} (in the
complete Heyting algebra) are not equally true.
3.1.5. Completeness aspirations of Leisenring and Asser
Different possible choices for the value of the generalized choice function f at the empty set are discussed in
Leisenring (1969), but as the consequences of any special choice are quite queer, the only solution that is found to
be sufficiently adequate in Leisenring (1969) is to consider validity in each model given by each generalized choice
function on the power set of the universe. Notice, however, that even in this case, in each single model, the value of
εx.A is still functionally dependent on the extension of A. Roughly speaking, in Leisenring (1969) the axioms (ε1),
and (ε2) from § 2.2 and (E2) from § 3.1.1 are shown to be complete w.r.t. this semantics of the ε in first-order logic.
This completeness makes it unlikely that this semantics exactly matches Hilbert’s intentions: Indeed, if Hilbert’s
intended semantics for the ε could be completely captured by adding the single and straightforward axiom (E2), this
axiom would not have been omitted in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70). It is my opinion that the reason for this omission
is that Hilbert’s intentions for the ε were not right-unique but indefinite: If Hilbert had intended a right-unique
behavior, it would not be impossible to derive (E2) from his axiomatization!
In Asser (1957) the objective is to find a semantics such that Hilbert’s ε-calculus of Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70) is
sound and complete for it. This semantics, however, has to depend on the details of the syntactical form of the ε-terms
and, moreover, turns out to be necessarily so artificial that in Asser (1957) the author himself does not recommend it
and admits not to believe that Hilbert could have intended it:
\AllerdingŊ iĆ dieser BegriĎ von AuŊwahlfunktion so kompliziert, dasŊ siĚ seine Verwendung in der inhaltliĚen Mathematik kaum empfiehlt."
[Asser (1957), p. 59, modernized orthography]
“This notion of a choice function, however,” (i.e. the type-3 choice function, providing a semantics for the
ε-operator) “is so intricate that its application in contentual mathematics is hardly to be recommended.”
\AngesiĚtŊ der Kompliziertheit deŊ BegriĎŊ der AuŊwahlfunktion dritter Art ergibt siĚ die Frage, ob bei Hilbert-BernayŊ (" . . . \)
wirkliĚ beabsiĚtigt war, diesen BegriĎ von AuŊwahlfunktion axiomatisĚ zu besĚreiben. AuŊ der DarĆellung bei Hilbert-BernayŊ glaube iĚ
entnehmen zu kŹnnen, dasŊ daŊ niĚt der Fall iĆ," [Asser (1957), p. 65, modernized orthography]
“The intricacy of the notion of the type-3 choice function puts up the question whether the intention in Hilbert
& Bernays (1968/70) (” . . . “) really was to describe this notion axiomatically. I believe I can draw from the
presentation in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70) that that is not the case,”
3.1.6. My assumption on Hilbert’s intentions
The statements of Bernays and Hilbert in the original German language cited in § 3.1.2 are ambiguous with respect
to the question of an intended (right-) unique behavior of the ε-operator. Hilbert probably wanted to have what we call
today “committed choice”, but simply used the word “function” for the following three reasons: Hilbert was not too
much interested in semantics anyway. The technical term “committed choice” did not exist at Hilbert’s time. Last but
not least, right-uniqueness conveniently serves as a global commitment to any choice and thereby avoids the problem
illustrated in Example 5 of § 2.4.
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applicability. For the price of right-uniqueness in capturing the semantics of sentences in natural language cf. § 7 and
Geurts (2000).
And what we are going to show in this paper is that there is no reason to pay that price!
3.2. Indefinite semantics in the literature
The only occurrences of an indefinite semantics for Hilbert’s ε in the literature seem to be Blass & Gurevich (2000)
and the references there.
Consider the formula εx. (x =x) = εx. (x =x) from Blass & Gurevich (2000) or the even simpler
εx. true = εx. true (REFLEX)
which may be valid or not, depending on the question whether the same object is taken on both sides of the equation
or not. In natural language this is like “Something is equal to something.”, whose truth is indefinite. If you do not think
so, consider εx. true 	= εx. true in addition, i.e. “Something is unequal to something.”, and notice that the two
sentences seem to be contradictory.
In Blass & Gurevich (2000), Kleene’s strong three-valued logic is taken as a mathematically elegant means to solve
the problems with indefiniteness. In spite of the theoretical and computational significance of this solution, however,
from a practical point of view, Kleene’s strong three-valued logic severely restricts its applicability. In applications,
a logic is not an object of meta-logical investigation but a tool, and logical arguments are never made explicit because
the presence of logic is either not realized at all or taken to be trivial, even by academics, unless they are formalists.
Thus, regarding applications, we had better adhere to our common meta-logic, which in the western world is a subset
of (modal) classical logic. A western court may accept that Lee Harvey Oswald killed John F. Kennedy as well as
that he did not; but cannot accept a third possibility, a tertium, as required for Kleene’s strong three-valued logic, and
especially not the interpretation given in Blass & Gurevich (2000) that he both did and did not kill him, which directly
contradicts any common sense.
4. Introduction to our novel indefinite free-variable semantics
4.1. Free γ - and free δ-variables
Before we can present our treatment of the ε, we have to provide some technical background. For a technically
more detailed introduction cf. Wirth (2004).
We will now introduce free γ -, δ−-, and δ+-variables. Free variables frequently occur in mathematical practice.
Their logical function varies locally. It is typically determined implicitly by the context and the obviously intended
semantics.
In this paper, however, we make this function explicit by using disjoint sets of variable-symbols for different
functions. The classification of a free variable is indicated by adjoining the respective γ , δ−, or δ+ to the upper right
of the symbol for the variable.
As already noted in Russell (1919), p.155, in mathematical practice, the free variables afree and bfree in the (quasi-)
formula
(afree + bfree)2 = (afree)2 + 2afree bfree + (bfree)2
obviously have a universal intention and the quasi-formula itself is not meant to denote a propositional function but
actually stands for the closed formula
∀a, b. ( (a + b)2 = (a)2 + 2a b + (b)2 )
In this paper, however, we indicate by
(aδ + bδ )2 = (aδ )2 + 2aδ bδ + (bδ )2
a proper formula with free δ−-variables, which—independently of its context—is logically equivalent to the univer-












asks us to find solutions for xfree and yfree. We make this intention syntactically explicit by writing



























but may additionally enable us to retrieve the solutions for xγ and yγ as the substitutions for xγ and yγ chosen in a
formal proof.
Finally, the free δ+-variables are to represent our ε-terms in the end. The names γ , δ−, and δ+ refer to the classi-
fication of reductive inference rules into α-, β-, γ -, and δ-rules of Smullyan (1968), as used in the following § 4.2.
4.2. γ - and δ-rules
Suppose we want to prove the existential property ∃x.A. The γ -rules of old-fashioned inference systems (such
as Gentzen (1935) or Smullyan (1968), e.g.) require us to choose a fixed witnessing term t as a substitute for the bound
variable immediately when eliminating the quantifier.
Let A be a formula. We do not permit binding of variables that already occur bound in a term or formula; that is:
∀x. A is only a formula if no binder on x already occurs in A. The simple effect is that our formulas are easier to
read and our γ - and δ-rules can replace all occurrences of x. Moreover, we assume that all binders have minimal
scope, e.g. ∀x, y. A ∧ B reads (∀x. ∀y. A) ∧ B . Let Γ and Π be sequents, i.e. disjunctive lists of formulas.
γ -rules: Let t be any term: Γ ∃x.A Π
A{x →t} Γ ∃x.A Π
Γ ¬∀x.A Π
A{x →t} Γ ¬∀x.A Π
Note that A is the conjugate of the formula A, i.e. B if A is of the form ¬B , and ¬A otherwise. Moreover, in the
good old days when trees grew upwards, Gerhard Gentzen (1909–1945) would have inverted the inference rules such
that passing the line means consequence. In our case, passing the line means reduction, and trees grow downwards.
More modern inference systems, however, (such as the ones in Fitting (1996)) enable us to delay the crucial choice
of the term t until the state of the proof attempt may provide more information to make a successful decision. This
delay is achieved by introducing a special kind of variable, called “dummy” in Prawitz (1960), “free” in Fitting (1996)
and in Footnote 11 of Prawitz (1960), and “meta” in the field of planning and constraint solving. We call these variables
free γ -variables and write them like xγ . When these additional variables are available, we can reduce ∃x.A first to
A{x →xγ} and then sometime later in the proof we may globally substitute xγ with an appropriate term.
The addition of the free γ -variables changes the notion of a term but not the γ -rules, whereas it becomes visible in
the δ-rules. δ-rules introduce free δ-variables. The free δ-variables are also called “parameters” or “eigenvariables”
and typically stand for arbitrary objects of which nothing is known. Now the occurrence of such a free δ-variable
must be disallowed in the terms that may be substituted for those free γ -variables which had already been in use
when an application of a δ-rule introduced this free δ-variable. The reason for this restriction on replacement of free
γ -variables is that the dependence or scoping of the quantifiers must somehow be reflected in a dependence of the
free variables. This dependence is to be captured in a binary relation on the free variables, called variable-condition.
Indeed, it is sometimes unsound to instantiate a free γ -variable xγ with a term containing a free δ-variable yδ that was
introduced later than xγ :
Example 6. The formula ∃x. ∀y. (x =y)
is not generally valid. We can start a proof attempt as follows:
γ -step: ∀y. (xγ =y), ∃x. ∀y. (x =y)
δ-step: (xγ =yδ), ∃x. ∀y. (x =y)
Now, if the free γ -variable xγ could be substituted by the free δ-variable yδ, we would get the tautology (yδ =yδ),
i.e. we would have proved an invalid formula. To prevent this, the δ-step has to record (xγ, yδ) in a variable-condi-
tion, where (xγ, yδ) means that xγ is somehow “necessarily older” than yδ, so that we must not instantiate the free
γ -variable xγ with a term containing the free δ-variable yδ. 
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that globally instantiate γ - and δ+-variables. This kind of instantiation of rigid variables is only sound if the resulting
variable-condition is still acyclic after adding, for each free variable xfree instantiated with a term t and for each free
variable zfree occurring in t , the pair (zfree, x free) to the variable-condition. For the advantages of our special version of
variable-conditions compared to previous approaches, such as Bibel (1987) or Kohlhase (1998), cf. §§ 2.1.5 and 2.2.1
of Wirth (2004).
To make things more complicated, there are basically two different versions of the δ-rules: standard δ−-rules
(also simply called “δ-rules”) and δ+-rules (also called “liberalized δ-rules”). They differ in the kind of free δ-vari-
able they introduce and—crucially—in the way they enlarge the variable-condition, depicted to the lower right of
the bar:
δ−-rules: Let xδ be a new free δ−-variable:
Γ ∀x.A Π
A{x →xδ } Γ Π Vγ δ+(Γ ∀x.A Π) × {xδ }
Γ ¬∃x.A Π
A{x →xδ } Γ Π Vγ δ+(Γ ¬∃x.A Π) × {xδ }
δ+-rules: Let xδ+ be a new free δ+-variable:
Γ ∀x.A Π {(xδ+, A{x →xδ+} )}
A{x →xδ+} Γ Π Vfree(∀x.A) × {xδ+}
Γ ¬∃x.A Π {(xδ+,A{x →xδ+})}
A{x →xδ+} Γ Π Vfree(¬∃x.A) × {xδ+}
Notice that Vγ δ+(Γ ∀x.A Π) denotes the set of the free γ - and δ+-variables occurring in the whole upper sequent,
whereas Vfree(∀x.A) denotes the set of all free (γ -, δ−-, δ+-) variables, but only the ones occurring in the principal
formula ∀x.A. The smaller variable-conditions generated by the δ+-rules mean more proofs. Indeed, the δ+-rules
enable additional proofs on the same level of γ -multiplicity (i.e. the number of repeated γ -steps applied to the identical
principal formula); cf. e.g. Example 2.8, Wirth (2004), p. 21. For certain classes of theorems, some of these proofs
are exponentially and even non-elementarily shorter than the shortest proofs which apply only δ−-rules; for a survey
cf. Wirth (2004), § 2.1.5. Moreover, additional proofs are possible with the δ+-rules, which are not only shorter but
also more natural and easier to find both by human beings and by automated systems; see the discussion on the
design goals for inference systems in Wirth (2004), § 1.2.1, and the proof of the limit theorem for + in Wirth (2006a).
Summing it all up, the name “liberalized” for the δ+-rules is indeed justified: They provide more freedom to the
prover.1
Moreover, note that the singleton sets indicated to the upper right of the bar of the above δ+-rules are to augment
another global binary relation besides the variable-condition, namely a function called the choice-condition. This will
be explained in § 4.5f.
There is a popular alternative to variable-conditions, namely Skolemization, where the free δ-variables become
functions (i.e. their order is incremented) and the δ−- and δ+-rules give them the free γ -variables of Vγ(Γ ∀x.A Π)
and Vγ(∀x.A), resp., as initial arguments. Then, the occur-check of unification implements the restrictions on
substitution of free γ -variables. In some inference systems, however, Skolemization is unsound (e.g. for higher-order
systems such as the one in Kohlhase (1998) or the system in Wirth (2004) for descente infinie) or inappropriate (e.g. in
the matrix systems of Wallen (1990)). We prefer inference systems with variable-conditions because they are simpler,
more general, and not less efficient than Skolemizing inference systems. Notice that variable-conditions do not add
unnecessary complexity: Firstly, if variable-conditions are superfluous we can work with an empty variable-condi-
tion as if there would be no variable-condition at all. Secondly, we will need the variable-conditions anyway for our
choice-conditions, which again are needed to formalize our novel approach to Hilbert’s ε-operator.
4.3. Quantifier elimination and subordinate ε-terms
The elimination of ∀- and ∃-quantifiers with the help of ε-terms (cf. § 2.2) may be more difficult than expected
when some ε-terms become “subordinate” to others. In Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), Vol. II, p. 24, these subordi-
nate ε-terms, which are responsible for the difficulty to prove the ε-theorems constructively, are called “untergeordnete
ε-AuŊdrđĘe”.
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ordinate to an (occurrence of an) ε-term εx.A if
1. εx.A is a subterm of B and
2. an occurrence of the variable v in εx.A is free in B
(i.e. the binder on v binds an occurrence of v in εx.A ).
An (occurrence of an) ε-term a is subordinate to an ε-term εv.B (or, more generally, a binder on v together with its
scope B) if εv.B is superordinate to a. 
Example 8 (Quantifier elimination and subordinate ε-terms).
Consider the formula ∀x. ∃y. ∀z. P(x, y, z). Let us apply (ε1) and (ε2) from § 2.2 to remove the three quantifiers
completely. We introduce the following abbreviations:
za(x)(y) = εz. ¬P(x, y, z)
ya(x) = εy. P(x, y, za(x)(y))
yb(x) = εy. ∀z. P(x, y, z)
xa = εx. ¬P(x, ya(x), za(x)(ya(x)))
xb = εx. ¬P(x, ya(x), za(x)(yb(x)))
xc = εx. ¬P(x, yb(x), za(x)(yb(x)))
xd = εx. ¬∀z. P(x, yb(x), z)
xe = εx. ¬∃y. ∀z. P(x, y, z)
When we eliminate inside–out (i.e. start with the elimination of ∀z.) the transformation is
∀x. ∃y. P(x, y, za(x)(y)), ∀x. P(x, ya(x), za(x)(ya(x))), P(xa, ya(xa), za(xa)(ya(xa))).
When we eliminate outside–in (i.e. start with the elimination of ∀x.) the transformation is
∃y. ∀z. P(xe, y, z), ∀z. P(xe, yb(xe), z), P(xe, yb(xe), za(xe)(yb(xe))), . . ., P(xa, ya(xa), za(xa)(ya(xa))),
where the dots represent the rewritings of xe over xd , xc, xb to xa (four times) and of yb to ya (twice in addition). Note
that the resulting formula is the same in both cases. Indeed, it does not depend on the order in which we eliminate
the quantifiers. Moreover, notice that this formula is quite deep. Indeed, in general n nested quantifiers result in an
ε-nesting depth of 2n−1 and huge ε-terms (such as xa) occur up to n times with commitment to their choice.
If we write the resulting formula as
P(xa, yc, zd) (8.1)
by setting yc = ya(xa), and zd = za(xa)(ya(xa)), then we have
zd = εz. ¬P(xa, yc, z) (8.2)
yc = εy. P(xa, y, zc(y)) (8.3)
with zc(y) = εz. ¬P(xa, y, z) (8.4)
xa = εx. ¬P(x, ya(x), zb(x)) (8.5)
with zb(x) = εz. ¬P(x, ya(x), z)
and ya(x) = εy. P(x, y, za(x)(y))




Firstly, note that the free variables x and y in the ε-terms zc(y), zb(x), ya(x), za(x)(y) are actually bound by the next ε
to the left, to which the respective ε-terms thus become subordinate. For example, the ε-term zc(y) is subordinate to
the ε-term yc. Secondly, the top ε-binders on the right-hand sides of the defining equations are exactly those that
require a commitment to their choice. This means that each of za , zb , zc , and zd may be chosen differently without
affecting soundness of the equivalence transformation. The same holds for ya and yc. Note that the variables are
strictly nested into each other. Thus we must choose in the order of za , ya , zb , xa , zc , yc, zd . Moreover, for zc , zb , ya ,
za we actually have to choose functions instead of a simple objects.





εyα.P(x, yα, εzα.¬P(x, yα, zα)),
εzβ.¬P
(





and yc and zd take several lines more to write them down. 
The exponential explosion of term depth of Example 8 can be avoided by an outside–in removal of δ-quantifiers
without removing the quantifiers below ε-binders and by a replacement of γ -quantified variables with free γ -variables.
For the case of Example 8, this yields P(xe, yγ, ze) with ze = εz. ¬P(xe, yγ, z) and xe = εx. ¬∃y. ∀z. P(x, y, z).
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deeper than 14 (n+1)2. If we are only interested in reduction and not in equivalence transformation of a formula, we
can abstract Skolem functions from the ε-terms and just reduce to the formula P(xδ, yγ, zδ(yγ)). In a non-Skolemizing
inference system with a variable-condition we get P(xδ, yγ, zδ) instead, with {(yγ, zδ)} as an extension to the variable-
condition. The ideas of Skolemization and of treating γ - and δ-quantifiers differently go back to the Peirce–Schröder
tradition (cf. Anellis (2004)), Löwenheim (1915) (read charitably), Skolem (1928), and Herbrand (1930). Note that
with Skolemization or variable-conditions we have no growth of nesting depth at all, and the same will be the case for
our term-sharing approach to ε-terms.
4.4. Do not be afraid of indefiniteness!
From the discussion in §§ 2.4 and 3, one could get the impression that an indefinite logical treatment of the ε is
not easy to find. Indeed, on first sight, there is the problem that some standard axiom schemes cannot be taken for
granted, such as substitutability s = t ⇒ f (s)=f (t) (note that this is similar to (E2) of § 3.1.1 when we take
logical equivalence as equality!) and such as reflexivity t = t (note that (REFLEX) of § 3.2 is an instance of this!).
This means that it may not be sound to replace a subterm with an equal term and that even syntactically equal terms
may not be definitely equal.
In computer programs, however, we are quite used to committed choice and to an indefinite behavior of choosing,
and the violation of substitutability and even reflexivity is no problem:
Example 9 (Violation of substitutability and reflexivity in programs).
fun choose s = case s of Set (i :: _) => i | _ => raise Empty;
is the ML code of a function that chooses an element from a set implemented as a list. It simply returns the first element
of the list. For another set that is equal—but where the list may have another order—the result may be different. Thus,
the behavior of the function choose is indefinite for a given set, but each time it is called for an implemented set,
it chooses a special element and commits to this choice, i.e. when called again, it returns the same value. In this case
we have choose s = choose s, but s= t does not imply choose s = choose t. In an implementation
where some parallel reordering of lists may take place, even choose s = choose s may be wrong. 
From this example we may learn that the question of choose s = choose s may be indefinite until the choice
steps have actually been performed. This is exactly how we will treat our ε. The steps that are performed in logic are
proof steps. Thus, on the one hand, when we want to prove
εx. true = εx. true
we can choose 0 for both occurrences of εx. true, get 0=0, and the proof is successful. On the other hand, when
we want to prove
εx. true 	= εx. true
we can choose 0 for one occurrence and 1 for the other, get 0 	=1, and the proof is successful again.
This procedure may seem wondrous, but is very similar to something quite common with free γ -variables, cf. § 4.1:
On the one hand, when we want to prove
xγ =yγ
we can choose 0 to substitute for both xγ and yγ , get 0=0, and the proof is successful.
On the other hand, when we want to prove
xγ 	=yγ
we can choose 0 to substitute for xγ and 1 to substitute for yγ , get 0 	=1, and the proof is successful again.
4.5. Replacing ε-terms with free δ+-variables
There is an important difference between the inequations εx. true 	= εx. true and xγ 	=yγ at the end of the
previous § 4.4: The latter does not violate the reflexivity axiom! And we are going to cure the violation of the former
immediately with the help of a special kind of free variables, namely our free δ+-variables, cf. § 4.1. Now, instead of
εx. true 	= εx. true we write xδ+ 	=yδ+ and remember what these free δ+-variables stand for by storing this into a
function C, called a choice-condition:






For a first step, suppose that our ε-terms are not subordinate to any outside binder, cf. Definition 7. Then, we can
replace an ε-term εz.A with a new free δ+-variable zδ+ and extend the partial function C by
C(zδ
+
) := A{z →zδ+}.
By this procedure we can eliminate all ε-terms without loosing any syntactical information.
As a first consequence of this elimination, the substitutability and reflexivity axioms are immediately regained, and
the problems discussed in § 4.4 disappear.
A second reason for replacing the ε-terms with free δ+-variables is that the latter can solve the question whether
a committed choice is required: We can express—on the one hand—a committed choice by using a single free
δ+-variable and—on the other hand—a choice without commitment by using several variables with the same choice-
condition.
Indeed, this also solves our problems with committed choice of Example 5 of § 2.4: Now, again using (ε1),
∃x. (x 	= x) reduces to xδ+ 	= xδ+ with
C(xδ
+
) := (xδ+ 	= xδ+)
and the proof attempt immediately fails due to the now regained reflexivity axiom.
As the second step, we still have to explain what to do with subordinate ε-terms. If the ε-term εz. A contains
free occurrences of exactly the distinct variables v0, . . . , vl−1, then we have to replace this ε-term with the application
term zδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) of the same type as z (for a new free δ+-variable zδ+) and to extend the choice-condition C by
C(zδ
+
) := λv0. . . . λvl−1. A{z → zδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1)}.
Example 10 (Higher-order choice-condition). (continuing Example 8 of § 4.3)





d ) (cf. (8.1)!) (10.1)
with the following higher-order choice-condition:
C(zδ
+
d ) := ¬P(xδ+a , yδ+c , zδ+d ) (cf. (8.2)!) (10.2)
C(yδ
+
c ) := P(xδ+a , yδ+c , zδ+c (yδ+c )) (cf. (8.3)!) (10.3)
C(zδ
+
c ) := λy. ¬P(xδ+a , y, zδ+c (y)) (cf. (8.4)!) (10.4)
C(xδ
+
a ) := ¬P(xδ+a , yδ+a (xδ+a ), zδ+b (xδ+a )) (cf. (8.5)!) (10.5)
C(zδ
+
b ) := λx. ¬P(x, yδ+a (x), zδ+b (x)) (cf. (8.6)!) (10.6)
C(yδ
+
a ) := λx. P(x, yδ+a (x), zδ+a (x)(yδ+a (x))) (cf. (8.7)!) (10.7)
C(zδ
+
a ) := λx. λy. ¬P(x, y, zδ+a (x)(y)) (cf. (8.8)!) (10.8)
Notice that this representation of (8.1) is smaller and easier to understand than all previous ones. Indeed, by combi-
nation of λ-abstraction and term sharing via free δ+-variables, in our framework the ε becomes practically feasible
for the first time. 
4.6. Instantiating free δ+-variables (“ε-substitution”)
Having realized Requirement I (Syntax) of § 1 in the previous § 4.5, in this § 4.6 we are now going to explain how
to satisfy Requirement II (Reasoning). To this end, we have to explain how to replace free δ+-variables with terms
that satisfy their choice-conditions.
The first thing to know about free δ+-variables is: Just like the free γ -variables and contrary to free δ−-variables,
the free δ+-variables are rigid in the sense that the only way to replace a free δ+-variable is to do it globally, i.e. in all
formulas and all choice-conditions in an atomic transaction.
In reductive theorem proving, such as in sequent, tableau, or matrix calculi, we are in the following situation: While
a free γ -variable xγ can be replaced with nearly everything, the replacement of a free δ+-variable yδ+ requires some
proof work, and a free δ−-variable zδ cannot be instantiated at all.
Contrariwise, when formulas are used as tools instead of tasks, free δ−-variables can indeed be replaced—and this
even locally (i.e. non-rigidly). This is the case not only for purely generative calculi, such as resolution and paramod-
ulation calculi and Hilbert-style calculi such as the predicate calculus of Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), but also for
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§ 2.5.2.
More precisely—again considering reductive theorem proving, where formulas are proof tasks—a free γ -vari-
able xγ may be instantiated with any term (of appropriate type) that does not violate the current variable-condition,
cf. § 5.2 for details. The instantiation of a free δ+-variable yδ+ additionally requires some proof work depend-
ing on the current choice-condition C, which also puts some requirements on the variable-condition R and thus
is formally called an R-choice-condition, cf. Definition 22 for the formal details. In general, if a substitution σ
replaces—possibly among other free γ -variables and free δ+-variables—the free δ+-variable yδ+ in the domain of
the R-choice-condition C, then—to know that the global instantiation of the whole proof forest with σ preserves its
soundness—we have to prove (QC(yδ+))σ , where QC is given as follows:
Definition 11 (QC ).
For an R-choice-condition C, we let QC be a total function from dom(C) into the set of single-formula sequents
such that for each yδ+ ∈ dom(C) with
C(yδ
+
) = λv0. . . . λvl−1. B
for a formula B , we have
QC(y
δ+) = ∀v0. . . .∀vl−1.
( ∃y. B{yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) → y} ⇒ B )
for an arbitrary fresh bound variable y ∈ Vbound\V(C(yδ+)). 
Note that QC(yδ+) is nothing but a formulation of axiom (ε0) from § 2.1 in our framework, and Lemma 32 states its
validity.
It is an essential property of our choice-conditions that all occurrences of yδ+ in B necessarily are of the form
yδ
+
(v0) · · · (vl−1), cf. Definition 22(2). 2 Therefore, the formula QC(yδ+) is logically equivalent to the formula
∀v0. . . .∀vl−1.
( ∃z. B{yδ+ →z} ⇒ B )
for a new bound variable z of the same type as yδ+.
Example 12 (Predecessor function).
Suppose that our domain is natural numbers and that yδ+(p1) has the choice-condition
C(yδ
+
(p1)) = λv. (v=yδ+(p1)(v)+1).
Then, before we may instantiate yδ+(p1) with the symbol p for the predecessor function specified by ∀x.
(
p(x+1)=x ),
we have to prove (Q(yδ+(p1))){yδ+(p1) → p}, which reads as
∀v. ( ∃y. (v=y+1) ⇒ (v=p(v)+1) ),
and is valid in arithmetic. 
Example 13 (Canossa 1077). (continuing Example 4)
The situation of Example 4 now reads
Holy Ghost = zδ+0 ∧ Joseph = zδ+1 (13.1)
with C(zδ+0 ) = Father(zδ+0 , Jesus),
and C(zδ+1 ) = Father(zδ+1 , Jesus).
This avoids the previous trouble with the Pope because nobody knows whether zδ+0 = zδ+1 holds. On the one hand,
knowing (1.2) from Example 1 of § 2.1, we can prove (13.1) as follows: We first substitute zδ+0 with Holy Ghost
because, for σ0 := {zδ+0 →Holy Ghost}, we have (C(zδ+0 ))σ0 and—a fortiori— (QC(zδ+0 ))σ0, which reads∃z. Father(z, Jesus) ⇒ Father(Holy Ghost, Jesus);
and, analogously, substitute zδ+1 with Joseph because, for σ1 := {zδ+1 →Joseph}, we have (C(zδ+1 ))σ1 and—a fortiori—
(QC(z
δ+
1 ))σ1. After these substitutions, (13.1) becomes the tautology
Holy Ghost = Holy Ghost ∧ Joseph = Joseph
On the other hand, if we want to have trouble, we can apply the substitution
σ ′ = {zδ+0 → Joseph, zδ+1 → Joseph}
to (13.1) because of (QC(zδ+0 ))σ ′ = (QC(zδ+1 ))σ1 = (QC(zδ+1 ))σ ′. Then our task is to show
Holy Ghost = Joseph ∧ Joseph = Joseph
To prove (13.1), this is a stupid trial, however. 
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To satisfy Requirement III (Semantics) of § 1, we now present our novel semantics for the ε more formally, which
is required for precision and consistency. As consistency of our new semantics is not trivial at all, technical rigor
cannot be avoided. From § 4 the reader should have a good intuition of our intended representation and semantics of
the ε, free δ+-variables, and choice-conditions in our framework.
This § 5 is organized as follows: In §§ 5.2 and 5.4 we formalize variable-conditions and explain how to deal with
free γ -variables syntactically and semantically. In § 5.3 we introduce a preliminary semantics that does not treat free
δ+-variables properly, and in § 5.6 we provide a proper semantics. We discuss choice-conditions in § 5.5. Our interest
goes beyond soundness in that we want “preservation of solutions”. By this we mean the following: All closing
substitutions for the free γ -variables and free δ+-variables—i.e. all solutions that transform a proof attempt (to which
a proposition has been reduced) into a closed proof—are also solutions of the original proposition. This is similar to
a proof in the programming language PROLOG (cf. Kowalski (1979)), computing answers to a query proposition that
contains free γ -variables. Therefore, in § 5.7 we discuss this solution-preserving notion of reduction, especially under
the aspect of global instantiation of free δ+-variables. All in all, in this § 5, we extend and simplify the presentation
of Wirth (2004), which contains also a comparative discussion, compatible extensions for descente infinie, and those
proofs that are omitted here.
5.1. Basic notions and notation
‘N’ denotes the set of natural numbers and ‘≺’ the ordering on N. Let N+ := { n∈N | 0 	=n }. We use ‘unionmulti’ for the
union of disjoint classes and ‘id’ for the identity function. For classes R, A, and B we define:
dom(R) := {a | ∃b. (a, b)∈R } domain
AR := {(a, b)∈R | a∈A} restriction to A
〈A〉R := {b | ∃a∈A. (a, b)∈R } image of A, i.e. 〈A〉R = ran(AR)
And the dual ones:
ran(R) := {b | ∃a. (a, b)∈R } range
RB := {(a, b)∈R | b∈B } range-restriction to B
R〈B〉 := {a | ∃b∈B. (a, b)∈R } reverse-image of B, i.e. R〈B〉 = dom(RB)
Furthermore, we use ‘∅’ to denote the empty set as well as the empty function. Functions are (right-) unique relations
and the meaning of ‘f ◦g’ is extensionally given by (f ◦g)(x) = g(f (x)). The class of total functions from A to B
is denoted as A → B . The class of (possibly) partial functions from A to B is denoted as A B . Both → and 
associate to the right, i.e. A B → C reads A (B → C).
Let R be a binary relation. R is a relation on A if dom(R) ∪ ran(R) ⊆ A. R is irreflexive if id ∩ R = ∅.
It is A-reflexive if Aid ⊆ R. Speaking of a reflexive relation we refer to the largest A that is appropriate in the
local context, and referring to this A we write R0 to ambiguously denote Aid. With R1 := R, and Rn+1 := Rn◦R
for n ∈ N+, Rm denotes the m-step relation for R. The transitive closure of R is R+ :=⋃n∈N+ Rn. The reflexive
& transitive closure of R is R∗ :=⋃n∈N Rn. A relation R (on A) is well-founded if each non-empty class B (⊆A)
has an R-minimal element, i.e. ∃a∈B. ¬∃a′ ∈B. a′Ra.
5.2. Variables and R-substitutions
We assume the following four sets of symbols to be disjoint:
Vγ free γ -variables, i.e. the free variables of Fitting (1996)
Vδ free δ-variables, i.e. nullary parameters, instead of Skolem functions
Vbound bound variables, i.e. variables to be bound, cf. below
 constants, i.e. the function and predicate symbols from the signature
As explained in § 4.1, we partition the free δ-variables into free δ−-variables and free δ+-variables: Vδ = Vδ unionmulti Vδ+.
We define the free variables by Vfree := Vγ unionmulti Vδ and the variables by V := Vbound unionmulti Vfree. Finally, the rigid variables
by Vγ δ+ := Vγ unionmulti Vδ+. We use ‘Vk(Γ )’ to denote the set of variables from Vk occurring in Γ .
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each occurrence of a variable x ∈ dom(σ ) in Γ with σ(x). (Actually, we may have to rename some of the bound
variables in σ(x) when we exclude the binding of a variable within the scope of a bound variable of the same name.)
Unless otherwise stated, we tacitly assume that all occurrences of variables from Vbound in a term or formula or in the
range of a substitution are bound occurrences (i.e. that a variable x ∈ Vbound occurs only in the scope of a binder on x)
and that each substitution σ satisfies dom(σ ) ⊆ Vfree, so that no bound occurrences of variables can be replaced and
no additional variable occurrences can become bound (i.e. captured) when applying σ .
Several binary relations on free variables will be introduced. The overall idea is that when (x, y) occurs in such a
relation this means something like “x is necessarily older than y” or “the value of y depends on x or is described in
terms of x”.
Definition 14 (Variable-condition). A variable-condition is a subset of Vfree×Vfree. 
Definition 15 (σ -update). Let R be a variable-condition and σ be a substitution.
The σ -update of R is R ∪ { (zfree, x free) | x free ∈dom(σ ) ∧ zfree ∈Vfree(σ (x free)) }. 
Definition 16 (R-substitution). Let R be a variable-condition.
σ is an R-substitution if σ is a substitution and the σ -update of R is well-founded. 
Syntactically, (x free, y free)∈R is to express that an R-substitution σ must not replace x free with a term in which
yfree could ever occur. This is guaranteed when the σ -updates R′ of R are always required to be well-founded. For
zfree ∈ Vfree(σ (x free)), we get zfree R′ x free R′ y free, blocking zfree against terms containing y free. Note that in practice a
σ -update of R can always be chosen to be finite. In this case, it is well-founded iff it is acyclic.
5.3. R-validity
Instead of defining validity from scratch, we require some abstract properties typically holding in two-valued
semantics. Validity is given relative to some -structure S , assigning a non-empty universe (or “carrier”) to each
type. For X ⊆ V we denote the set of total S-valuations of X (i.e. functions mapping variables to objects of the
universe of S (respecting types)) with
X → S
and the set of (possibly) partial S-valuations of X with
X S
For δ : X → S we denote with ‘Sunionmultiδ’ the extension of S to the variables of X. More precisely, we assume some
evaluation function ‘eval’ such that eval(Sunionmultiδ) maps each term whose constants and free occurring variables are
from unionmultiX into the universe of S (respecting types) such that for all x ∈ X: eval(Sunionmultiδ)(x) = δ(x). Moreover,
eval(Sunionmultiδ) maps each formula B whose constants and free occurring variables are from unionmultiX to TRUE or FALSE,
such that B is valid in Sunionmultiδ iff eval(Sunionmultiδ)(B)=TRUE.
Notice that we leave open what our formulas and what our -structures exactly are. The latter can range from a
first-order -structure to a higher-order modal -model, provided that the following two standard textbook lemmas
hold for a term or formula B (possibly with some unbound occurrences of variables from Vbound) and a -structure S
with valuation δ : V S .
EXPLICITNESS LEMMA
The value of the evaluation function on B depends only on the valuation of those variables that actually occur free
in B; formally: For X being the set of variables that occur free in B , if X ⊆ dom(δ):
eval(Sunionmultiδ)(B) = eval(S unionmulti Xδ)(B). 
SUBSTITUTION [VALUE] LEMMA
Let σ be a substitution. If the variables that occur free in Bσ belong to dom(δ), then:
eval(Sunionmultiδ)(Bσ) = eval( S unionmulti ( ( σ unionmulti V\dom(σ )id ) ◦ eval(Sunionmultiδ) ) )(B ). 
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As this new kind of validity depends on a variable-condition R, it is called “R-validity”. It provides the free
γ -variables with an existential semantics given by their valuation (e)(δ) : Vγ → S , and the free δ-variables with a
universal semantics by δ : Vδ → S .
The definition is top-down and the function  (having nothing to do with Hilbert’s ε) and the notion of an (S,R)-
valuation are to be explained in § 5.4, which also contains examples illustrating R-Validity.
Definition 17 (R-validity, K).
Let R be a variable-condition. Let S be a -structure with valuation δ : V S . Let G be a set of sequents.
G is R-valid in S if there is an (S,R)-valuation e such that G is (e,S)-valid.
G is (e,S)-valid if G is (δ′, e,S)-valid for all δ′ : Vδ → S .
G is (δ, e,S)-valid if G is valid in S unionmulti (e)(δ) unionmulti δ.
G is valid in Sunionmultiδ if Γ is valid in Sunionmultiδ for all Γ ∈ G.
A sequent Γ is valid in Sunionmultiδ if there is some formula listed in Γ that is valid in Sunionmultiδ.
Validity in a class of -structures is understood as validity in each of the -structures of that class. If we omit the
reference to a special -structure we mean validity in some fixed class K of -structures, such as the class of all
-structures or the class of Herbrand -structures. 
5.4. (S,R)-valuations
Let S be some -structure. We now define semantical counterparts of our R-substitutions on Vγ , which we will
call “(S,R)-valuations”.
As an (S,R)-valuation plays the rôle of a raising function (a dual of a Skolem function as defined in Miller (1992)),
it does not simply map each free γ -variable directly to an object of S (of the same type), but may additionally read the
values of some free δ-variables under an S-valuation δ : Vδ → S . More precisely, an (S,R)-valuation e takes some
restriction of δ as a second argument, say δ′ : Vδ S with δ′ ⊆ δ. In short:
e : Vγ → (Vδ S) S .
Moreover, for each free γ -variable xγ , we require that the set dom(δ′) of free δ-variables read by e(xγ) is identical for
all δ. This identical set will be denoted with Se〈{xγ}〉 below. Technically, we require that there is some “semantical
relation” Se ⊆ Vδ×Vγ such that for all xγ ∈ Vγ :
e(xγ) : (Se〈{xγ}〉 → S) → S.
This means that e(xγ) can read the value of yδ if and only if (yδ, xγ)∈Se.
Note that, for each e : Vγ → (Vδ S) S, at most one semantical relation exists, namely
Se := { (yδ, xγ) | xγ ∈Vγ ∧ yδ ∈dom(⋃(dom(e(xγ)))) }.
In some of the following definitions we are slightly more general because we want to apply the terminology not only
to free γ -variables but also to free δ+-variables.
Definition 18 (Semantical relation (Se)).
The semantical relation for e is
Se := { (y, x) | x ∈dom(e) ∧ y ∈dom(⋃(dom(e(x)))) }.
e is semantical if e is a partial function on V such that for all x ∈ dom(e):
e(x) : (Se〈{x}〉 → S) → S . 
Definition 19 ((S,R)-valuation).
Let R be a variable-condition and let S be a -structure.
e is an (S,R)-valuation if e : Vγ → (Vδ S) S , e is semantical, and R ∪ Se is well-founded. 
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into a valuation (e)(δ) of the free γ -variables:
Definition 20 ().
We define the function  : (V (V S) S) → (V S) → V  S
for e : V (V S) S, δ : V S, x ∈ V
by (e)(δ)(x) := e(x)(Se〈{x}〉δ). 
Example 21 (R-validity).
For xγ ∈ Vγ , yδ ∈ Vδ, the sequent xγ=yδ is ∅-valid in each S because we can choose Se := Vδ×Vγ and e(xγ)(δ) :=
δ(yδ) for δ : Vδ → S , resulting in (e)(δ)(xγ) = e(xγ)(Se〈{xγ }〉δ) = e(xγ)(Vδδ) = δ(yδ). This means that ∅-validity of
xγ=yδ is the same as validity of ∀y. ∃x. x=y. Moreover, note that (e)(δ) has access to the δ-value of yδ just as a
raising function f for x in the raised (i.e. dually Skolemized) version f (yδ)=yδ of ∀y. ∃x. x=y.
Contrary to this, for R := Vγ×Vδ, the same formula xγ=yδ is not R-valid in general because then the required
well-foundedness of R ∪ Se (cf. Definition 19) implies Se =∅, and the value of xγ cannot depend on δ(yδ) anymore,
due to e(xγ)(Se〈{xγ }〉δ) = e(xγ)(∅δ) = e(xγ)(∅). This means that (Vγ×Vδ)-validity of xγ=yδ is the same as validity
of ∃x. ∀y. x=y. Moreover, note that (e)(δ) has no access to the δ-value of yδ just as a raising function c for x in
the raised version c=yδ of ∃x. ∀y. x=y.
For a more general example let G = { Ai,0 . . .Ai,ni−1 | i ∈ I }, where, for i ∈ I and j ≺ni , the Ai,j are formulas
with free γ -variables from e and free δ-variables from u. Then (Vγ×Vδ)-validity of G means
∃e. ∀u. ∀i ∈ I. ∃j ≺ni. Ai,j
whereas ∅-validity of G means ∀u. ∃e. ∀i ∈ I. ∃j ≺ni. Ai,j
Also each other sequence of universal and existential quantifiers can be represented by a variable-condition R,
starting from the empty set and applying the δ-rules from § 4.2. A translation of a variable-condition R into a se-
quence of quantifiers may, however, require a strengthening of dependences, in the sense that a backwards translation
would result in a variable-condition R′ with R  R′. This means that our variable-conditions can express logical
dependences more fine-grained than standard quantifiers. 
5.5. Choice-conditions
Definition 22 (Choice-condition).
C is an R-choice-condition if R is a well-founded variable-condition and C is a partial function from Vδ+ into the set
of formula-valued λ-terms, such that for all yδ+ ∈ dom(C):
(1) zfree R∗ yδ+ for all zfree ∈ Vfree(C(yδ+)), and
(2) C(yδ+) is of the form λv0. . . . λvl−1. B , where
B is a formula whose free occurring variables from Vbound
are among {v0, . . . , vl−1} ⊆ Vbound
and where, for v0 : α0, . . . , vl−1 : αl−1, we have
yδ
+ : α0 → ·· · → αl−1 → αl for some type αl ,
and each occurrence of yδ+ in B is of the form yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1). 
Example 23 (Choice-condition). (continuing Example 10)
















then the C of Example 10 is an R-choice-condition, indeed.
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C′(zδ+d ) := ¬P(xδ+a , yδ+c , zδ+d )
C′(yδ+c ) := P(xδ+a , yδ+c , zδ+d )
C′(xδ+a ) := ¬P(xδ+a , yδ+c , zδ+d )
then he would—among other things—need zδ+d R+ yδ
+
c R
+ zδ+d , by Definition 22(1) due to the values of C′ at yδ+c
and zδ+d . This renders R non-well-founded. Thus, this C′ cannot be an R-choice-condition for any R. Note that
the choices required by C′ for yδ+c and zδ
+
d are in an unsolvable conflict, indeed.
(c) For a more elementary example, take
C′′(xδ+) := (xδ+=yδ+)
C′′(yδ+) := (xδ+ 	=yδ+)
Then xδ+ and yδ+ form a vicious circle of conflicting choices for which no valuation can be found that is compatible
with C′′, cf. Definition 24 and Lemma 25 below. But C′′ is no choice-condition at all because there is no well-
founded variable-condition R that could turn it into an R-choice-condition. 
We now split our valuation δ : Vδ → S ; while τ : Vδ → S valuates the free δ−-variables, π valuates the remaining
free δ+-variables. As the choices of π may depend on τ , the technical realization is similar to that of the dependence
of the (S,R)-valuations on the free δ-variables, as described in § 5.4.
Definition 24 (Compatibility).
Let C be an R-choice-condition, S a -structure, and e an (S,R)-valuation.
π is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R) if
(1) π : Vδ+ → (Vδ  S) S is semantical (cf. Definition 18) and
R ∪ Se ∪ Sπ is well-founded.
(2) For all yδ+ ∈ dom(C) with C(yδ+) = λv0. . . . λvl−1. B for a formula B ,
for all τ : Vδ → S , for all η : {yδ+} → S , and for all χ : {v0, . . . , vl−1} → S ,
setting δ := (π)(τ ) unionmulti τ unionmulti χ and δ′ := η unionmulti V\{yδ+}δ (i.e. δ′ is the η-variant of δ):
If B is (δ′, e,S)-valid, then B is also (δ, e,S)-valid. 
Roughly speaking, Item (1) of this definition requires—for similar reasons as before—that the flow of information
between variables expressed in R, e, and π is acyclic.
To understand Item (2), consider an R-choice-condition C := {(yδ+, λv0. . . . λvl−1. B)}, which restricts the value
of yδ+ with the formula-valued λ-term λv0. . . . λvl−1. B . Then C simply requires that a different choice for the
(π)(τ )-value of yδ+ cannot give rise to the validity of the formula B in S unionmulti (e)(δ) unionmulti δ. Or—in other words—that
(π)(τ )(yδ
+
) is chosen such that B becomes valid, whenever such a choice is possible. This is closely related to
Hilbert’s ε-operator in the sense that yδ+ is given the value of
λv0. . . . λvl−1. εy. B{yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) → y}
for a fresh bound variable y.
As the choice for yδ+ depends on the other free variables of λv0. . . . λvl−1.B ( i.e. the free variables of
λv0. . . . λvl−1. εy. B{yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) → y} ), we included this dependence into the transitive closure of the vari-
able-condition R in Definition 22(1). Therefore, the well-foundedness of R avoids the conflict of Example 23(c).
Note that the empty function ∅ is an R-choice-condition for each well-founded variable-condition R. Furthermore,
each π with π : Vδ+ → {∅} → S is (e,S)-compatible with (∅,R) due to Sπ =∅. Indeed, as stated in the following
lemma, a compatible π always exists. This is due to Definition 22(1) and the well-foundedness of R∪Se (according
to Definition 19) and due to the restriction on the occurrence of yδ+ in B in Definition 22(2).
Lemma 25. If C is an R-choice-condition, S a -structure, and e an (S,R)-valuation, then there is some π that
is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R). 
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with a simple soundness condition plays an important rôle in inference:
Definition 26 (Extension). (C′,R′) is an extension of (C,R) if C is an R-choice-condition, C′ is an R′-choice-
condition, C⊆C′, and R⊆R′. 
Lemma 27 (Extension). Let (C′,R′) be an extension of (C,R).
If e is an (S,R′)-valuation and π is (e,S)-compatible with (C′,R′),
then e is also an (S,R)-valuation and π is also (e,S)-compatible with (C,R). 
After global application of an R-substitution σ we now have to update both R and C:
Definition 28 (Extended σ -update). Let C be an R-choice-condition and let σ be a substitution.
The extended σ -update (C′,R′) of (C,R) is given by:
C′ := { (x,Bσ) | (x,B)∈C ∧ x 	∈dom(σ ) },
R′ is the σ -update of R, cf. Definition 15. 
Lemma 29 (Extended σ -update). If C is an R-choice-condition, σ an R-substitution, and if (C′,R′) is the extended
σ -update of (C,R), then C′ is an R′-choice-condition. 
5.6. (C,R)-validity
While the notion of R-validity (cf. Definition 17) already provides the free γ -variables with an existential seman-
tics, it fails to give the free δ+-variables the proper semantics according to an R-choice-condition C. This deficiency
is overcome in the following notion of “(C,R)-validity”, which—roughly speaking—requires the following: For
arbitrary values of the free δ−-variables, we must be able to choose values for the free δ+-variables satisfying C,
and then we must be able to choose values for the free γ -variables, such that the sequents become valid. Note that
the dependences of these choices are restricted by R. In a formal top down representation, this reads:
Definition 30 ((C,R)-validity).
Let C be an R-choice-condition, let S be a -structure, and let G be a set of sequents.
G is (C,R)-valid in S if
G is (π, e,S)-valid for some (S,R)-valuation e and some π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R).
G is (π, e,S)-valid if G is ( (π)(τ ) unionmulti τ, e, S )-valid for each τ : Vδ → S . 
Notice that the notion of (π, e,S)-validity with π : Vδ+ → (Vδ  S) S differs from (δ, e,S)-validity with
δ : V S as given in Definition 17, so that the last line of Definition 30 is indeed an explicit definition. Moreover,
notice that (C,R)-validity treats the free δ+-variables properly, whereas R-validity of Definition 17 does not.
In our framework the formula (E2) of § 3.1.1 looks like (E2′) in the following lemma.
Lemma 31 ((C,R)-validity of (E2′)). Let C be an R-choice-condition.
For i ∈ {0,1}, let Ai be a formula in which x ∈ Vbound may occur free, and assume xδ+i ∈ Vδ+ with
C(xδ
+
i ) = Ai{x →xδ+i }, xδ+i 	∈ V(A0,A1), xδ+i 	∈dom(R), and xδ+i 	∈ V(〈V\{xδ+i }〉C).
The formula
∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ xδ+0 =xδ+1 (E2′)
is (C,R)-valid. 
Note that the pre-conditions of Lemma 31 may simply be achieved by taking fresh free δ+-variables xδ+0 and xδ+1
and adding (Vfree(Ai{x →xδ+i })\{xδ+i }) × {xδ+i } to the current variable-condition. Roughly speaking, Lemma 31 holds
because after choosing a value for xδ+ we can take the same value for xδ+, simply because xδ+ is new and can read all0 1 1
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look it up in Wirth (2006b). Moreover, in Example 36 we will do a formal, nice, and short proof of Lemma 31 in our
calculus.
As already noted in § 4.6, the single-formula sequent QC(yδ+) of Definition 11 is a formulation of axiom (ε0) of § 2.1
in our framework.
Lemma 32 ((C,R)-validity of QC(yδ+)).
Let C be an R-choice-condition. Let yδ+ ∈ dom(C).
The single-formula sequent QC(yδ+) is (C,R)-valid.
Moreover, QC(yδ
+
) is (π, e,S)-valid for each -structure S , each (S,R)-valuation e, and
each π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R). 
Proof. Let C(yδ+) = λv0. . . . λvl−1. B for a formula B . Then we have
QC(y
δ+) = ∀v0. . . .∀vl−1.
( ∃y. B{yδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) → y} ⇒ B )
for some y ∈ Vbound\V(C(yδ+)). For π being (e,S)-compatible with (C,R), the (π, e,S)-validity follows now
directly from Definition 24(2), according to the short discussion following Definition 11. 
5.7. Reduction
Reduction is the reverse of consequence. It is the backbone of logical reasoning, especially of abduction and goal-
directed deduction. Our version of reduction does not only reduce a set of problems to another set of problems but
also guarantees that the solutions of the latter also solve the former; where “solutions” means the valuations for the
rigid variables, i.e. for the free γ -variables and the free δ+-variables.
Definition 33 (Reduction).
Let C be an R-choice-condition.
Let S be a -structure, and let G0 and G1 be sets of sequents.
G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S if
for each (S,R)-valuation e and each π that is (e,S)-compatible with (C,R):
if G1 is (π, e,S)-valid, then G0 is (π, e,S)-valid. 
Theorem 34 (Reduction).
Let C be an R-choice-condition; S a -structure; G0, G1, G2, and G3 sets of sequents.
1. (Validity) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S and G1 is (C,R)-valid in S,
then G0 is (C,R)-valid in S, too.
2. (Reflexivity) In case of G0⊆G1: G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S .
3. (Transitivity) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S and G1 (C,R)-reduces to G2 in S,
then G0 (C,R)-reduces to G2 in S.
4. (Additivity) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G2 in S and G1 (C,R)-reduces to G3 in S,
then G0∪G1 (C,R)-reduces to G2∪G3 in S.
5. (Monotonicity) For (C′,R′) being an extension of (C,R):
(a) If G0 is (C′,R′)-valid in S, then G0 is (C,R)-valid in S.
(b) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S, then G0 (C′,R′)-reduces to G1 in S.
6. (Instantiation) For an R-substitution σ on Vγ δ+, for the extended σ -update (C′,R′) of (C,R), and
for O := dom(C) ∩ dom(σ ) ∩ R∗〈Vδ+(G0,G1)〉:
(a) If G0σ ∪ (〈O〉QC)σ is (C′,R′)-valid in S, then G0 is (C,R)-valid in S.
(b) If G0 (C,R)-reduces to G1 in S, then G0σ (C′,R′)-reduces to G1σ ∪ (〈O〉QC)σ in S. 
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Item 6 follows from Lemma B.6 of Wirth (2004) when we set the meta variable N of Lemma B.6 to
dom(C) ∩ 〈(dom(C) ∩ dom(σ )) \ O〉R∗. 
Items 1 to 5 of Theorem 34 are straightforward. Item 6 is only technically complicated. Roughly speaking, the idea
behind Item 6 is that reduction stays invariant under global application of the substitution σ on rigid variables, provided
that we change from (C,R) to its extended σ -update (C′,R′) and that, in case that σ replaces some free δ+-vari-
able yδ+ constrained by the choice-condition C, we can establish that this is a proper choice by showing (QC(yδ+))σ ,
cf. Definition 11. The rest of this § 5.7 will give further explanation for the application of Theorem 34 and especially
for Item 6.
Example 35 (Instantiation with dom(C) ∩ dom(σ ) = ∅).
For a simple application of Theorem 34(6b), where no free δ+-variables occur and only a free γ -variable is instan-
tiated, let us have a glimpse at the example proof of Wirth (2004), § 3.3. Let G0 be the proposition we want to
prove, namely { zγ0(xδ0 )(yδ0 ) ≺ ack(xδ0 , yδ0 ) }, which says that Ackermann’s function has a lower bound that is to
be determined during the proof. Moreover, let G1 —together with variable-condition R and R-choice-condition ∅ —
represent the current state of the proof. Then G0 (∅,R)-reduces to G1. Moreover, in the example, G1 reduces to a
known lemma when we apply the substitution σ := {zγ0 → λx.λy. y}. Now, Theorem 34(6b) says that the instanti-
ated (and λβ-reduced) theorem { yδ0 ≺ ack(xδ0 , yδ0 ) } (∅,R)-reduces to the instantiated proof state G1σ and thus is
(∅,R)-valid by Theorem 34(3,1). Note that in this case the extended σ -update of (∅,R) is (∅,R) itself, and we have
O =∅ due to dom(C) ∩ dom(σ ) = ∅. Moreover, by Theorem 34(6a), also the original { zγ0(xδ0 )(yδ0 ) ≺ ack(xδ0 , yδ0 ) }
is known to be (∅,R)-valid, but who would be interested in this weaker result now? 
Example 36 ((C,R)-validity of (E2′)). (continuing Lemma 31)
Let us give a formal proof of (E2′) in our framework on a very abstract level by applying Theorem 34. We will reduce
the set containing the single-formula sequent of the formula (E2′) to a valid set. This will complete our proof by
Theorem 34(1). In the following, be aware of the requirements on occurrence of the variables as described in Lem-
ma 31. We extend (C,R) with a fresh variable yδ+ with
C′(yδ+) :=
(
(∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ yδ+=xδ+0 )∧ (¬∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ A1{x → yδ+})
)
.
Of course, to satisfy Definition 22(1), the current variable-condition R must be extended to
R′ := R ∪ (Vfree(A0,A1) ∪ {xδ+0 }) × {yδ+}.
Note that, if we had done this extension during the proof, we would have needed Item 5b of Theorem 34 to keep
reduction invariant, but as there is no reduction sequence given yet, it suffices to use Item 5a instead. Similarly, instead
of Item 6b, we apply Item 6a, with σ := {xδ+1 → yδ+}. Then we have O ⊆ dom(C) ∩ dom(σ ) = {xδ+1 }.
For (C′′,R′′) being the extended σ -update of (C′,R′), Item 6a says that it suffices to show (C′′,R′′)-validity of
the set with the two single-formula sequents ∀x. (A0⇔A1) ⇒ xδ+0 =yδ+ and (QC′(xδ+1 ))σ . The latter sequent
reads (∃x. A1{x → xδ+1 }{xδ+1 → x} ⇒ A1{x → xδ+1 })σ , i.e. ∃x. A1 ⇒ A1{x → yδ+}. But a simple case analysis on∀x. (A0⇔A1) shows that the whole set (C′′,R′′)-reduces to⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
















i.e. to {QC′′(xδ+0 ); QC′′(yδ+)}, which is (C′′,R′′)-valid by Lemma 32. (Note that by Item 4 of Theorem 34 it would
have been sufficient to show that each of the formulas of the set (C′′,R′′)-reduces to some (C′′,R′′)-valid set.) Thus,
(E2′)σ is (C′′,R′′)-valid. By Item 6a this means that (E2′) is (C′,R′)-valid, and by Item 5a this means that (E2′) is
(C,R)-valid, as was to be shown. Finally, note that we have R′′ = R′ ∪ {(yδ+, xδ+1 )}, so that σ is an R′-substitution.
















C.-P. Wirth / Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008) 287–317 309Example 37 (Instantiation with higher-order choice-condition). (continuing Example 12)
Suppose that
(p1) ∀v. ( ∃y. (v=y+1) ⇒ (v=p(v)+1) )
is one of our lemmas for the predecessor function p in the arithmetic of natural numbers, and that we want to use this
lemma as justification for replacing yδ+(p1) under R-choice-condition C(yδ+(p1)) = λv. (v=yδ+(p1)(v)+1) globally with p.
Note that this was required in Example 12.
By Theorem 34(6), for σ := {yδ+(p1) →p}, we have to show (QC(yδ+(p1)))σ , which is just the above lemma (p1). 
6. Summary of our free-variable framework for Hilbert’s ε
According to Smullyan’s classification of (problem-) reduction rules into α, β , γ , and δ, we call the quanti-
fiers eliminated and the variables introduced by γ - and δ-rules, γ - and δ-quantifiers and free γ - and free δ-vari-
ables, respectively. Splitting the free δ-variables into simple (δ−) and liberalized ones (δ+), we get three kinds
of free variables (written xfree) in our free-variable framework, namely δ−-, δ+-, and γ -variables. Regarding va-
lidity, free δ−-variables (written xδ ) are implicitly universally quantified, whereas free δ+-variables (xδ+) and free
γ -variables (xγ ) are implicitly existentially quantified. The structure of quantification is represented globally in a
variable-condition R, which is a directed acyclic graph on free variables, roughly speaking in such a way that a free
δ-variable yδ is put into the scope of another free variable x free by an edge (x free, yδ). The value of a free δ+-variable yδ+
given by π may depend on the value of free δ−-variables xδ . In that case, the semantical relation Sπ , contains an
edge (xδ , yδ+). Similarly, the value of a free γ -variable yγ given by e may depend on the value of a free δ-variable xδ
if (xδ, yγ) ∈ Se. The quantificational structure is enforced by the requirement that R ∪ Se ∪ Sπ must be acyclic,
cf. Definitions 18 and 24.
Suppose that an ε-term εz.A has free occurrences of exactly the variables v0, . . . , vl−1 which are not free variables
of our framework, but are bound in the context of this ε-term. Then we replace it in its context with the application
term zδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) for a fresh free δ+-variable zδ+ and set the value of a global function C, called the choice-
condition, at zδ+ according to
C(zδ
+
) := λv0. . . . λvl−1. A{z → zδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1)},
and extend R with an edge (y free, zδ+) for each free variable y free occurring in A. A free δ+-variable must take a
value that makes its choice-condition C(zδ+) true—if such a choice is possible: Let ‘eval’ be the standard evaluation
function. Let S be any of the semantical structures under consideration. Let χ be an arbitrary S-valuation of the
variables v0, . . . , vl−1. Then zδ+ has to denote a function f such that, whenever there is some S-valuation δ′ of z with
eval(Sunionmultiχunionmultiδ′)(A) = TRUE, we also have eval(Sunionmultiχ unionmulti δ)(A) = TRUE for δ := {z → f (χ(v0), . . . , χ(vl−1))}.
We take a sequent to be a list of formulas which denotes the disjunction of these formulas. The only logical infer-
ence we need is (problem-) reduction, the backbone of abduction and goal-directed deduction, cf. § 5.7. In reduction,
free δ−-variables behave as constant parameters, free γ -variables may be globally instantiated with each term, and
the instantiation of free δ+-variables must additionally satisfy the current choice-condition. In addition, the applied
substitution σ must be an R-substitution, which means that the current variable-condition R remains acyclic when
we extend R to its so-called σ -update, which additionally consists of the edges from the free variables in σ(zγ δ+)
to zγ δ+, for each free variable zγ δ+ in dom(σ ). In case of a free δ+-variable zδ+ ∈ dom(σ ) ∩ dom(C), σ satisfies
the current choice-condition C if (QC(zδ+))σ can be shown in the context of the updated variable-condition and
choice-condition. Here, for a choice-condition C(zδ+) given as above, QC(zδ+) denotes the formula
∀v0. . . .∀vl−1.
( ∃z.A ⇒ A{z → zδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1)} )
which is nothing but our version of Hilbert’s axiom (ε0), cf. Definition 11. Moreover, the global choice-condition C
must be updated by removing zδ+ from its domain dom(C) and by applying σ to the C-values of the free δ+-variables
remaining in dom(C). Under these conditions, the invariance of reduction under substitution is stated in Theo-
rem 34(6b). Finally, note that QC(zδ+) itself is always valid in our framework, cf. Lemma 32.
The major difference to Hilbert’s original underspecified ε-operator is that we do not have the requirement of
globally committed choice for any ε-term: Different free δ+-variables with the same choice-condition may take
different values. A minor difference is that the term-sharing of ε-terms with the help of free δ+-variables improves
the readability of our formulas considerably. Finally, opposed to the semantics of Leisenring (1969) and all other
classical semantics for the ε, the implicit quantification of our free δ+-variables is existential instead of universal,
which simplifies theorem proving because we only have to find an arbitrary solution instead of checking all of them.
310 C.-P. Wirth / Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008) 287–3177. Linguistic examples
Due to the close relation of descriptive terms to semantics of determiners of articles and anaphoric pronouns in
natural language, we exemplify our novel version of Hilbert’s ε with several linguistic standard examples.
The general task in our examples will be to find a logical representation for a problematic sentence in natural
language, and possibly to refine this representation in a reductive proof attempt with instantiation of free variables.
Indeed, our free-variable framework with its reduction and instantiation can be extended to a framework of
weighted abduction as found in Hobbs (2003ff.), Chapter 3. The “typical elements” of Hobbs (1996) should then
be modeled by a new form of free δ+-variables obtained by changing “some π” in Definition 30 into “each π” as in
Wirth (1998), Definition 5.7 (Definition 4.4 in short version); cf. also our § 8.3. Two different “typical elements” of
the same set (cf. Hobbs (1996), p. 6 of WWW version) can then be modeled as two variables with the same choice-
condition.
I lack the expertise to claim that the following examples have any relevance to the area of computer linguistics, but
the following aspects of our framework may be interesting to philosophers of language and to computer linguists:
1. It combines the two major requirements for the usefulness of operators for descriptive terms in the description of
the semantics of determiners of natural language, namely non-right-uniqueness (cf. § 7.1) and committed choice
(cf. § 7.2).
2. It comes with a free-variable framework, which may help to overcome problems with quantifiers and their scope
limits, cf. § 7.2.
3. Our novel and disentangled semantical framework for Hilbert’s ε-operator may serve as a platform for the design
of similar operators for descriptive terms tailored to the special requirements resulting from the description and
computation of the semantics of natural language, cf. § 8.3.
7.1. Problems with right-uniqueness and extensionality
Right-uniqueness of descriptive terms means that different occurrences of syntactically equal terms must denote
identical objects, typically given by a (right-unique) choice function applied to the extension of the description,
cf. § 3.1. In such an extensional semantics, even syntactically different terms must denote the same object if the
extensions of their descriptions are equal.
The problematic aspect of the following example (U1) is that the two occurrences of the same phrase “a bishop”
probably denote two different bishops.
A bishop met a bishop. (U1)
Thus, to be appropriate for the description of indefinite determiners in natural language, right-uniqueness of descrip-
tive terms must be avoided and a non-right-unique representation must be chosen.
We model (U1) as Met(bδ+1 , bδ+2 ) with choice-condition C(bδ+1 ) := Bishop(bδ+1 ) and C(bδ+2 ) := Bishop(bδ+2 ). Even
if we found out that Met may be reflexive, we still could apply the substitution σ := {bδ+2 →bδ+1 }, because (QC(bδ+2 ))σ
is equal to QC(bδ+1 ), i.e. the substitution σ satisfies the choice-condition C according to Theorem 34(6) due to
Lemma 32.
In Geurts (2000), the use of Hilbert’s ε in form of choice functions for the semantics of indefinites is attacked in
several ways and, roughly speaking, the following thesis is put up:
There is no way to interpret indefinites in situ, but some form of “movement” is necessary, which may be interpreted
as changing scopes of quantifiers.
Although the examples given in Geurts (2000) are perfectly convincing in the given setting, we point out that these
problems with the ε disappear when one uses a non-right-unique version such as ours. The following three example
sentences and their labels are the ones of Geurts (2000).
All bicycles were stolen by a German. (1a)
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and
∀x. ( Bicycle(x) ⇒ ∃y. (German(y) ∧ StolenBy(x, y)) ) (1a-weak)
∃y. (German(y) ∧ ∀x. (Bicycle(x) ⇒ StolenBy(x, y)) ) (1a-strong)
and switching between the two requires some “movement”.
We model this as Bicycle(xδ ) ⇒ StolenBy(xδ , yδ+) with choice-condition C(yδ+) := German(yδ+). If—in a
first step—we find a model for this sentence with an empty variable-condition, then—in a second step—we can check
whether it also satisfies a variable-condition that contains (yδ+, xδ ) in addition. A success of the first step provides us
with a model for the weaker reading; a success of the second step with one for the stronger reading, too; i.e. that all
bicycles were stolen by the same German. And this without “moving” any quantifiers or the like.
For a more interesting problem with right-unique ε, let us consider:
Every girl gave a flower to a boy she fancied. (5)
As a (generalized) choice function must pick the identical element from an identical extension, in Geurts (2000) there
is a problem with two girls who love all boys, but give their flowers to two different ones. Ignoring past tense, we
model this as Girl(xδ ) ⇒ Give(xδ , zδ+, yδ+) with choice-condition
C(yδ
+




Geurts’ problem does not appear in our modeling simply because our semantical relation (cf. Definition 18) does not
depend on the common extension of their love, but—to admit the dependences of yδ+ and zδ+ on xδ —only has to con-
tain (xδ , yδ+) and (xδ , zδ+), which is in accordance with our variable-condition (which only has to contain (xδ , yδ+)
due to our above choice-condition for yδ+) in the sense that their union is acyclic, cf. Definition 24(1).
The same problem of a common extension but a different choice object—but now in all possible worlds and
intensions—of the following example is again no problem for us.
Every odd number is followed by an even number that is not equal to it. (7)
We model this as Odd(xδ ) ⇒ xδ +1=yδ+
with choice-condition C(yδ+) := Odd(xδ ) ⇒ Even(yδ+) ∧ yδ+ 	=xδ
7.2. Donkey sentences and Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator
If a man has a donkey, he beats it. (D)
So-called donkey sentences demonstrate difficulties of interaction of indefinite noun phrases in a conditional (“a man”,
“a donkey” in (D)) and anaphoric pronouns referring to them in the conclusion (“he”, “it”). For references on donkey
sentences, cf. e.g. Heusinger (1997), § 7. If semantics is represented with the help of quantification, donkey sentences
reveal difficulties resulting from quantifiers and their scopes.
If a man loves a woman, she loves him, too. (L0)





Female(x0) ∧ Loves(y0, x0)
) )
⇒ Female(xγ1) ∧ Loves(xγ1, yγ1) ∧ Male(yγ1) (L1)
we have no chance to resolve the reference of the pronouns “she” and “him” (xγ1 and yγ1) before we get rid of the
quantifiers. If we apply δ−-rules (cf. § 4.2) (besides α- and β-rules), we end up with the three sequents
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Female(xδ0 ), ¬Loves(yδ0 , xδ0 ), Female(xγ1)¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Female(xδ0 ), ¬Loves(yδ0 , xδ0 ), Loves(xγ1, yγ1)¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Female(xδ0 ), ¬Loves(yδ0 , xδ0 ), Male(yγ1)
(L2)
and a variable-condition R including {xγ1, yγ1} × {xδ0 , yδ0 }, which says that the substitution
σδ := {xγ1 →xδ0 , yγ1 →yδ0 }
which turns the first and last sequents into tautologies and the middle one (L2) into the intended reading of (L0), must
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¬Male(yδ+0 ), ¬Female(xδ+0 ), ¬Loves(yδ+0 , xδ+0 ), Female(xγ1)¬Male(yδ+0 ), ¬Female(xδ+0 ), ¬Loves(yδ+0 , xδ+0 ), Loves(xγ1, yγ1)¬Male(yδ+0 ), ¬Female(xδ+0 ), ¬Loves(yδ+0 , xδ+0 ), Male(yγ1)
and a variable-condition R including {(yδ+0 , xδ+0 )} instead. After application of the
R-substitution σδ+ := {xγ1 →xδ+0 , yγ1 →yδ+0 }, the instance of (L1) reduces to
¬Male(yδ+0 ), ¬Female(xδ+0 ), ¬Loves(yδ+0 , xδ+0 ), Loves(xδ+0 , yδ+0 ) (L3)














while our (σδ+-updated) R-choice-condition C generated by the δ+-rules is
C(yδ
+
0 ) := Male(yδ+0 ) ∧ ∃x0.
(




0 ) := Female(xδ+0 ) ∧ Loves(yδ+0 , xδ+0 )
But even if (L3) may be true, this is not what we wanted to say in (L0), where “she” and “he” are obviously meant to
be universal (strong, δ−), whereas our free δ+-variables here are implicitly existentially quantified, cf. Definition 30,
contrary to the ones in Wirth (1998), Definition 5.7 (Definition 4.4 in short version).
Instead of introducing a universally quantified kind of free δ+-variables in addition to our most useful existentially
quantified ones, we had better start without quantifiers from the very beginning, namely with
Male(yδ0 ) ∧ Loves(yδ0 , xδ0 ) ∧ Female(xδ0 )⇒ Female(xγ1) ∧ Loves(xγ1, yγ1) ∧ Male(yγ1) (L4)
and empty variable-condition R′, and then apply the R′-substitution σδ from above to reduce its instance to
¬Male(yδ0 ), ¬Loves(yδ0 , xδ0 ), ¬Female(xδ0 ), Loves(xδ0 , yδ0 ) (L5)
which captures the universal meaning of (L0) properly.
Instead of a donkey sentence such as (L0) that prefers a genuinely universal reading as in (L5), the following
donkey sentence prefers a partial switch to an existential reading:
If a bachelor loves a woman, he marries her. (M0)
If a Catholic bachelor loves three women, he is loved by each of them, but may marry at most one. Thus
Male(yδ0 ) ∧ Loves(yδ0 , xδ0 ) ∧ Female(xδ0 )⇒ Male(yγ1) ∧ Marries(yγ1, xγ1) ∧ Female(xγ1) (M1)
should be refined by application of {xγ1 → xδ+1 , yγ1 → yδ0 } and simplification to






1 ) := Male(yδ0 ) ⇒ Loves(yδ0 , xδ+1 ) ∧ Female(xδ+1 ) (C2)
On the one hand, if there is no women loved by the bachelor yδ0 , both (M2a) and (M2b) are valid. On the other hand,
if there is at least one woman he loves, (M2a) is valid due to its last formula and (C2), and (M2b)+(C2) expresses the
intended reading of (M0).
Notice that we indeed have the possibility to let “woman” be universal (strong, δ−) and “her” existential (weak, δ+),
picking one of the women loved by the bachelor—if there are any. Our treatment is more flexible than a similar one
of (D) along supposition theory in Parsons (1994). Moreover, both treatments are more lucid than that of a sentence
analogous to (M0) in Heusinger (1997) which we discuss in the following:
As we have just seen, a major advantage of reference in natural language is the possibility to refer to an object a
second time. Thus, the ε can hardly be of any use in semantics of natural language without the possibility to express
committed choice, cf. § 2.4. Unless we introduce special concepts (such as our free δ+-variables for ε-terms) we need
right-uniqueness to express committed choice, cf. §§ 2.4 and 3.1.6. As we have seen in § 7.1, right-uniqueness of
representation, however, must be abandoned in our linguistic context.
In Heusinger (1997), the right-uniqueness and the extensionality of the ε are kept, but the usefulness for describing
the semantics of natural language is improved by adding a situational index to the ε-symbol which makes it possi-
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occurrences of syntactically equal descriptive terms with different situational indexes. We refer to this indexed ε
as Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator. It already occurs in the English draft paper Heusinger (1996). Heusinger (1997),
however, is a German monograph on applying Hilbert’s epsilon to the semantics of noun phrases and pronouns in natu-
ral language, with a focus on salience. Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator is used to describe the definite as well as the
indefinite article in specific as well as non-specific contexts, resulting in four different representations. Cf. Heusinger
(1997) also for further reference on the ε in the semantics of natural language.








⇒ Marries( εa∗y.Male(y), εa∗x.Female(x) )
)
(19a′)
where the index a∗ of Heusinger’s indexed ε-operator seems to denote a choice function that chooses men as i does and
women as f (i) does. How a∗ is to be formalized remains unclear in Heusinger (1997). The real problem, however,
is that (19a′) does not represent the intended meaning of (M0): To wit, take an f such that f (i) always chooses a
woman not loved by the man chosen by i; then—ex falso quodlibet—our bachelors in love may remain unmarried,
contradicting (M0). A comparison on precision and simplicity of (19a′) with our above (M2b)+(C2) should speak for
itself.
For more linguistic example applications cf. Wirth (2006b).
8. Discussion
8.1. Where have all the ε-terms gone?
The ε-symbol does not occur anymore in our terms, and our formulas are much more readable than in the standard
approach of in-line presentation of ε-terms, which was always just a theoretical presentation because in practical
proofs the ε-terms would have grown so large that the mere size made them inaccessible to human inspection. To see
this, compare our presentation in Example 10 to the one in Example 8, which is still hard to read although we have
invested some efforts in a readable form of presentation. From a mathematical point of view, however, the original
ε-terms are still present in our approach, up to isomorphism and with the exception of some irrelevant term sharing.
To make these ε-terms explicit, we just have to apply the following small rewrite system: Let C be an R-choice-
condition. For any uδ+ ∈ dom(C), say C(uδ+) = λv0. . . . λvl−1. B for a formula B , consider the rewrite rule
uδ
+ = λv0. . . . λvl−1. εu. B{uδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1) → u}
for a fresh bound variable u (of proper type). Note that uδ+ does not occur in the right-hand side due to the restriction
on the occurrence of uδ+ in B to the form uδ+(v0) · · · (vl−1), according to Definition 22(2). Therefore, by the well-
foundedness of our variable-condition R and Definition 22(1), the left-hand side is bigger than the right-hand side in
the well-founded multiset extension of R. Thus, normalization of any formula A with these rewrite rules terminates
with a formula B . As typed λαβ-reduction is also terminating, we can apply it to remove the λ-terms introduced by
the rewriting.
Example 38. (continuing Example 10)
By the procedure described above, the R-choice-condition C of Example 10 in § 4.5 becomes the following rewrite




d = εzd . ¬P(xδ+a , yδ+c , zd) (cf. (10.2)!) 3 1
yδ
+
c = εyc. P(xδ+a , yc, zδ+c (yc)) (cf. (10.3)!) 2 2
zδ
+
c = λy. εzc. ¬P(xδ+a , y, zc) (cf. (10.4)!) — 1
xδ
+
a = εxa. ¬P(xa, yδ+a (xa), zδ+b (xa)) (cf. (10.5)!) 1 3
zδ
+
b = λx. εzb. ¬P(x, yδ+a (x), zb) (cf. (10.6)!) — 1
yδ
+
a = λx. εya. P(x, ya, zδ+a (x)(ya)) (cf. (10.7)!) — 2
zδ
+
a = λx. λy. εza. ¬P(x, y, za) (cf. (10.8)!) — 1




d ) (cf. (10.1)!) with this rewrite system plus λαβ-reduction, we end up in a normal
form which is the first-order ε-formula (8.1) of Example 8, with the exception of some renaming of ε-bound variables.
Note that the normal form even preserves our information on committed choice when we consider any ε-term binding
an occurrence of a variable of the same name to be committed to the same choice. In this sense, the representation of
the normal form is isomorphic to our original one via (10.1), R, and C. 
8.2. Are we breaking with the traditional treatment of Hilbert’s ε?
Our new semantical free-variable framework was actually developed to meet the requirements analysis for the
combination of mathematical induction in the liberal style of Fermat’s descente infinie with state-of-the-art logical
deduction. The framework provides a formal system in which a working mathematician can straightforwardly develop
his proofs supported by powerful automation, cf. Wirth (2004).
If traditionality meant restriction to expressional means of the early 20th century—with its foundational crisis and
special emphasis on constructivism, intuitionism, and proof transformation—then our approach would not classify as
traditional. But with its equivalents for the traditional ε-terms (cf. § 8.1) and for the ε-substitution methods (cf. §§ 4.6
and 5.7), our framework is deeply rooted in this tradition. In the meanwhile the fear of inconsistency should have
been cured by Wittgenstein (1939). The main disadvantage of a constructive syntactical framework for the ε as
compared to a semantical one is the following: Constructive proofs of practically relevant theorems become too huge
and too tedious, whereas semantical proofs are of a better manageable size. More important is the possibility to invent
new and more suitable logics for new applications with semantical means, whereas proof transformations can only
refer to already existing logics, cf. § 2.3. It is our intention with this paper to pass the heritage of Hilbert’s ε on
to new generations interested in computational linguistics, automated theorem proving, and mathematics assistance
systems; fields in which—with very few exceptions—the overall common opinion still is that the ε hardly can be of
any practical benefit.
8.3. On the design of similar operators
In § 1 we already mentioned that the semantical free-variable framework for our ε may serve as the paradigm for
the design of other operators similar to our version of the ε. In this § 8.3, we give some general hints on the two most
obvious options for adjustment of the presented definitions to achieve the intended properties of such new operators.
One option for adjustment is the definition of (C,R)-validity. For instance, the “some π” in Definition 30 is
something we can play around with. Indeed, in Wirth (1998), Definition 5.7 (Definition 4.4 in short version), we can
read “any π” instead (i.e. “each π”), which is just the opposite extreme, for which (E2′) of Lemma 31 is valid iff
∃!x.A0 ∨ ∃x.∀y.(x=y). In between of both extremes, we could design operators tailored for generalized quantifiers
(e.g. with cardinality specifications) or for the special needs of specification and computation of semantics of natural
language. Note that the changes of our general framework for these operators would be quite moderate: In any
case, it is “each π” what we read in the important Lemma 32 and the crucial Definition 33. Roughly speaking, only
Theorem 34(6a) for the case of O 	=∅ as well as Theorem 34(5a) would become false for a different choice on the
quantification of π in Definition 30. The reason why we prefer “some π” to “each π” here and in Wirth (2004) is
that “some π” results in additional valid formulas (e.g. (E2′)) and simplifies theorem proving. Contrary to “each π”
and to all classical semantics in the literature, “some π” frees us from considering all possible choices: We just have
to pick a single arbitrary one and fix it in a proof step. Moreover, “some π” is very close to Hilbert’s intentions on
ε-substitution as described best in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), Vol. II, § 2.4.
Another option for adjustment is the definition of compatibility. For instance, by modifying Item (2) of Defini-
tion 24 we can strengthen the notion of compatibility in such a way that either δ(yδ+) has to pick the smallest value
such that B is (δ, e,S)-valid or else, slightly weaker, has to pick a value v such that B is (δ, e,S)-valid and v is not
the successor of a natural number for which B becomes (δ, e,S)-valid. The latter modification of compatibility, for
instance, could be useful in an analysis of the failed trials of Hilbert’s group to show termination of ε-substitution in
arithmetic, as described in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), Vol. II, § 2.4.
All in all, in our conceptually disentangled framework for the ε, there are at least these two well-defined and
conceptually simple options for a convenient adjustment to achieve similar operators for different purposes.
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Our novel indefinite semantics for Hilbert’s ε presented in this paper was developed to solve the difficult soundness
problems that came up in the combination of mathematical induction (in the liberal style of Fermat’s descente infinie)
with state-of-the-art deduction. Thereby, it had passed an evaluation of its usefulness even before it was recognized as
a candidate for the semantics that David Hilbert probably had in mind for his ε. While the speculation on this question
will go on, the semantical framework for Hilbert’s ε proposed in this paper definitely has the following advantages:
Syntax: As right-uniqueness is not required, different objects may be chosen for different free δ+-variables with the
same choice-condition. The requirement of a commitment to a choice, however, is expressed syntactically
and most clearly by the sharing of a free δ+-variable, cf. § 4.5.
Semantics: Our novel semantics for the ε is simple and straightforward in the sense that the ε-operator becomes
similar to the referential use of the indefinite article in natural language, cf. § 7. Our semantics for the ε is
based on an abstract formal approach that extends a semantics for closed formulas (satisfying only very weak
requirements, cf. § 5.3) to a semantics with several kinds of free variables: existential (γ ), universal (δ−),
and ε-constrained (δ+).
Reasoning: In a reductive proof step, our representation of an ε-term εx.A can be replaced with each term t that
satisfies the formula ∃x.A ⇒ A{x →t}, cf. § 4.6. Thus, the soundness of such a replacement is likely
to be expressible and verifiable in the original calculus. Our free-variable framework for the ε is especially
convenient for developing proofs in the style of a working mathematician, cf. Wirth (2004), Wirth (2006a).
Indeed, our approach simplifies theorem proving because we do not have to consider all proper choices t
for x (as in Leisenring (1969) and all other classical semantical approaches) but only a single arbitrary one,
which is fixed in a proof step, just as choices are settled in program steps, cf. § 4.4.
Finally, we hope that our new semantical framework will help to solve further practical and theoretical problems and
improve the applicability of descriptive terms as a logical tool for specification and reasoning. Although we have only
touched the surface of the subject in § 8.3, a tailoring of operators similar to ours which meet the special demands of
specification and computation in other areas (such as philosophy of language and computer linguistics, cf. § 7) seems
to be especially promising.
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Notes
Note 1 One could object that Vfree(A) does not have to be a subset of Vγ δ+(Γ ∀x.A Π) in general. But the additional free δ−-variables
blocked by the δ+-rules (as compared to the δ−-rules) do not block proofs in practice. This has the following reason: With a reasonably minimal
variable-condition R, the only additional cycles that could occur are of the form yγ R zδ R xδ+ R ufree R∗ yγ with yγ , zδ ∈ V(Γ ∀x.A Π);
and in this case the corresponding δ−-rule would result in the cycle yγ R xδ R ufree R∗ yγ anyway. Moreover, δ−-rules and free δ−-variables do
not occur in inference systems with δ+-rules before Wirth (2004), so that in the earlier systems Vfree(A) is indeed a subset of Vγ δ+(Γ ∀x.A Π).
Note 2 If the occurrences of yδ+ in C(yδ+) could differ in their arguments, there could be irresolvable conflicts on special arguments. And, in
these conflicts, the choice of a function as a whole would essentially violate Hilbert’s axiomatizations: As only object variables and no functions
are considered for ε-binding in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70), the axiom schemes (ε0) and (ε-formula) (cf. § 2.2) seem to require us to choose the




(b) ∧ ¬(yδ+(true) ∧ yδ+(false))
)
, for choosing yδ+,
we are in conflict between • λb′. (b′ = false) (i.e. λb′.¬b′, for C(yδ+)(false) to be true) and
• λb′. (b′ = true) (i.e. λb′. b′, for C(yδ+)(true) to be true).
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